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ABSTRACT

A study analyzed and compared four selected models in the cyclical tradition of group development as a basis for identifying possible issues and implications for future theory building. The theorists whose models were examined were Leland Bradford, Jack Gibb, William Schutz, and Theodore Mills. Both historical and conceptual perspectives of the cyclical tradition were investigated prior to analysis of the models. Analysis focused on concepts related to these aspects of phase development: (1) phase sequence, (2) forces that impel and impede developmental sequences, (3) changes that characterize phase development, (4) the nature and function of recurring phenomena, (5) dynamics of member relations that are specific to phases and cycles of development, and (6) the nature and configurational patterns of developmental flow. Concepts used to describe aspects of phase development and recurring phenomena in the four models were identified and explored through definitional analysis (analysis of the descriptive and operational adequacy of the concept) and, when feasible, through comparative analysis (identification of parallels and disparities among different models). Important inferences and implications from the study were drawn for four focus areas: group process problem concepts, the motive forces of group development, phase theory and developmental flow, and cyclical theory. (YLB)

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THE CYCLICAL TRADITION: A STUDY OF PHASES AND CYCLES IN FOUR MODELS OF GROUP DEVELOPMENT

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THE CYCLICAL TRADITION:
A STUDY OF PHASES AND CYCLES IN FOUR MODELS OF GROUP DEVELOPMENT

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I. INTRODUCTION

Phase development theory is concerned with the nature and causes of distinctive sequences or time periods in the developmental life of a group. It is perhaps best described as micro-theory -- or "subsystem theory" in Rosenfeld's terms (17:39) -- because it attempts to describe and account for only one aspect of a larger system. Since phase theory is inseparably linked to the concepts used to explain the entire developmental process of the group, it is derivative and not independent of the propositions which describe the entire system. In one sense phase theory simply provides a point of entry and a perspective for viewing group development theory per se.

A person who wishes to investigate phase development theory can pursue three kinds of activities: (1) generate new theory and models, (2) analyze other persons' theories and models (a natural step in generating new theory), or (3) test theory through research. The present study analyzes and compares four selected models in the cyclical tradition

of group development as a basis for identifying possible issues and implications for future theory building. The analysis will focus on concepts related to these aspects of phase development: (a) phase sequence, (b) forces that impel and impede developmental sequences, (c) changes that characterize phase development, (d) the nature and function of recurring phenomena, (e) dynamics of member relations that are specific to phases and cycles of development, and (f) the nature and configurational patterns of developmental flow.

Concepts used to describe aspects of phase development and recurring phenomena in the four cyclical models of group development will be identified and explored through (a) definitional analysis, the process of analyzing the descriptive adequacy and the operational adequacy of the concepts, and when feasible, through (b) comparative analysis, the process of identifying parallels and disparities among different models.

A few descriptive terms must be clarified at the outset. Two definitions given here are considered preliminary definitions, i.e., definitions used to facilitate the launching of the study. As a preliminary definition of phase the writer used the following: a distinctive sub-period of developmental group life that is said to differ from contiguous sub-periods by virtue of a homogeneous pattern of events or of qualitative phenomena. For preliminary purposes, cyclical models were defined as those which describe group development in terms of a set of recurring events, problems, issues, or concerns. The group is said to develop as its members learn how to deal

with these factors collaboratively at increasingly higher levels of understanding. The issue of whether cyclic phenomena should be conceptualized in more rigorous terms is left to the final section on implications for future theory.

Cyclical models are considered as polar to linear development models, which describe development "on a straight line," with each successive phase considered to be distinctly different. The problems/issues that characterize a given phase do not recur and are not a predominant characteristic of any other phase (although they might recur as artifacts of regression).

Two concepts of developmental flow have been used: "discontinuous developmental flow" and "continuous flow" (8:159-160).* When the developmental flow is said to be discontinuous, the group must resolve one issue or set of problems before it can move on to the next phase; unresolved problems arrest the entire process of development. When the

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*Cohen and Smith, in their excellent review, speak of "sequential models with continuous flow" and "sequential models with discontinuous flow." I have used the term linear rather than "sequential" because it seems more nearly polar to the term "cyclical" and seems more appropriate for describing "straight line development," in which the phases occur in a fixed order. In addition, the term "linear" is advantageous because it is a generic descriptor capable of subsuming models featuring phases that occur predictably, but not in a predictable sequence. For a possible example of this linear type of model, the reader is directed to comments concerning Carl Rogers' writings in the final paragraph of Section II.

flow is said to be continuous, the group can move from problems characteristic of one phase to problems associated with another phase without resolving all of the process problems or issues of previous phases. Although a general sequence of events is usually said to exist, phases can overlap and issues that are characteristic of different phases can be worked at during any one phase.

II. THE CYCLICAL TRADITION

This sketch of the cyclical tradition is intended to provide both historical and conceptual perspectives before the reader encounters the analysis of selected models of cyclical development. The historical background is presented through a review of selected writings which indicate how the cyclical theorists have been depicted in the literature since the 1950s, especially by writers who have reviewed or attempted to classify models of group development. To provide a conceptual perspective, an effort is made to describe and illustrate the primary issues that separate cyclical from linear theory.

An Historical Perspective

Cyclic elements have been present in group development theory since the inception of the modern group development movement. The origin of published small-group cyclic theory can be traced back at least as far as a 1951* study by Bales and Strodbeck (2:485-495) -- also a landmark in the early development of phase theory. They described a model in which three phases -- orientation, evaluation, and control -- were said to recur each time a group engages in problem solving. Although some would argue that this model describes very brief

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*A paper by Leland Bradford and T. Mallinson, said to have been written in 1950 (6:204), advocated a cyclical approach to small group development theory. It was published by N.T.L. in 1958 as a chapter in the book, The Dynamics of Group Life, but was not available to the writer.

phases in "decision development" rather than phases in long-terms "group development," Bales was reported to have believed that the three phases were also descriptive of long-term group development (21:178). Although Bales and Strodbeck's phases were defined in terms of three intellectual processes, and the length of each phase was arbitrarily determined by the researchers, two factors in their research are significant in the context of cyclical and phase development theory. First, it did establish the existence of phases as qualitatively different subperiods in the life of a group. Second, it demonstrated that problems of orientation, evaluation, and control were present during all three phases, even though each problem was predominant in only one of the phases. Thus, the concept of continuous developmental flow -- a characteristic associated with cyclical theory -- was established as early as 1951.

In 1953, another significant model in the cyclical tradition appeared -- that of Parsons, Bales and Shils (15:163-269). They suggested an ever ascending spiral of four-stage cycles, the stages dealing with the recurring problems of (1) adaptation, (2) goal reduction, (3) integration, and (4) emotional expression and maintenance of patterns. In 1958, Schutz published his theory of group development featuring recurring cycles of group problem-solving activities (19), and by the mid-1960s, both Bradford

and Gibb had written chapters in an influential book indicating that group development was characterized by cyclical movement (6). However, most other writers continued to pay very little attention to the cyclical aspects of theory (if "attention" is defined in terms of published reviews and critical analyses).

Tuckman's was the first major review (1965) of group development models (23:384-399). Although he did not classify the existing models, he did review 50 published works on group development, and as a result, proposed a 4-stage model that purported to integrate existing models. The resulting synthesis was a linear model and contained no cyclical elements. Tuckman implied that he incorporated in his synthesis major aspects of two cyclical models -- those of Bradford and Schutz. However, in both cases he seems to have used only those characteristics that would fit into a linear synthesis. One gets the uncomfortable feeling that his universal model had an a priori linear existence. For example, Tuckman refers to events in each of what he calls Bradford's five phases/stages; but in the passages cited by Tuckman, Bradford did not present his descriptive data as a stage/phase model. In fact, he seems to have carefully avoided using the terms "phase" and "stage." And Tuckman did <u>not</u> refer to Bradford's passages in which group develoment was characterized as basically cyclical. Also, for example,

Tuckman cited Schutz's third phase as being concerned with affection problems, when actually it is concerned with all three problems. While the resolving of affection problems is the predominant activity in Schutz's third phase, the phase also includes recurring activities of inclusion-problem and control-problem resolution as intrinsic parts of the phase. Tuckman failed to incorporate this cyclical aspect of Schutz's phases into his universal model. He incorporated only the predominant-problem activities in Schutz's phases. Only these elements would fit the linear model Tuckman seems to have been bent on constructing. Perhaps Tuckman thought of Schutz's multiple problem/continuous-flow features of each phase as relatively minor aspects of Schutz's theory; actually it is these features that help make Schutzian theory distinctively Schutzian.

In 1970, Whitaker reviewed group development models and said that most theorists interpret group development "as a series of phases -- or at least as some sort of recurring cycle of member attraction...," referring to the models of Homans and Bales and Strodbeck as illustrations of the latter (25:309). Thus, he formally recognized the existence of "some sort of" cyclical conceptualization of group development, although he implies it was the lesser of the two types of models, and the cyclical models he referred to were almost 20 years old.

In 1973, Hares' review (11:259-303) of major models included only two long term development models with cyclical elements -- Schutz's and Mills'. Also in 1973, Cohen and Smith (8:159-180) devised a classification of development models which recognized the existence of cyclical models. They used three descriptive rubrics: cyclic models, sequential phase models with continuous flow, and sequential phase models with discontinuous flow. Although they mentioned a few representative models for each classification, the comparing of types of models was not their major purpose.

In 1974, Gibbard, Hartman, and Mann (10:83-93) classified models of group development into three classes: linear-progressive models, pendular or recurring cycle models, and life-cycle models. Since the terminology of their classification is somewhat puzzling, their categories are briefly analyzed here. For precision of meaning the authors defined both words in their descriptor "linear-progressive."* By linear they mean "the group moves onward and upward toward the implicit goals of the training group." Although their upward movement sounds more like a spiral (cyclical) configuration than a linear one, their main point emphasizes the constancy of the group's development toward the training goal

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*The term "linear" appears to be the primary descriptor. Thus the term "progressive" (a secondary descriptor) proclaims the classification to be a possible sub-type and thus implies the possible existence of a second sub-type, "linear-non-progressive." The authors fail to explore this possibility, but in the context of their definitions Cohen and Smith's "sequential model with continuous developmental flow" would seem to exemplify a sub-type of this kind.

is also considered to be a characteristic of cylical (spiral) models of development. The whole point of group process issues recurring and being resolved at increasingly higher levels of complexity and participant understanding exemplifies growth toward a desired end-state. The authors' concept of linearity as constant movement toward the final goal is somewhat puzzling. Most linear models of group development are characterized by discontinuous developmental flow, rather than by "constant movement toward the final goal." The "constant movement" is a characteristic of cyclic models, not linear models (in the present study it is called "continuous developmental flow").

The defining characteristic they assign to the term "progressive" -- finishing one phase completely before moving to the next, i.e., avoiding cyclical recurrence -- appears to be the same concept Cohen and Smith use to define their category "sequential models with discontinuous flow."

Their second category, "pendular or recurring cycle models," appears to be an attempt to include two sub-types of cyclical models under one heading:

(1) The recurring cycle type model: the authors describe this sub-type as consisting of recurring cycles of group attention to certain issues in group life. Schutz's recurring phases of Inclusion, Control, and Affection are used as examples.

(2) The pendular type model: the group is said to oscillate back and forth like a pendulum between two issues that remain continually unresolved. Bales' two-phase model is cited as an example (12:127-131) in which the group (an equilibrium-seeking organism) moves back and forth through a two-phase cycle: (a) the group deals with external task demands at the expense of deteriorating interpersonal relations; then (b) the group deals with its internal demands for group maintenance at the expense of deteriorating external task demands, and so on.

The authors emphasize as a distinguishing characteristic of the pendular sub-type that the polar issues are never completely resolved. But neither are the basic process issues completely resolved in the "recurring cycle" sub-type model, either, according to Schutz's theory, and it is Schutz's model that the authors use to illustrate their "recurring cycle" sub-type.

Their third category, "life-cycle" models, is not a distinctive type of model, but rather an elaborated linear sub-type that adds and emphasizes a final phase in which the group deals with its own demise as a group. (The authors point out this fact.) Further, the term "life-cycle" classifies models in terms of time-span of development rather than in terms of characteristics that are better able to differentiate

types and sub-types. For example, almost all models of long-term group development could be classified as either "life-cycle" or "formation-to-maturity" models.

The following statement by Gibbard, Hartman and Mann (10:88) illustrates the dangers of investing common words with special meanings: "How can there be progress in the face of recurring patterns and cycles?" To cyclical theorists such as Schutz, the above statement would be utterly meaningless, since their models of group development are built on the assumption that "progress" (meaning individual and group growth) requires the members to resolve issues that recur cyclically. However, Gibbard, Hartman, and Mann do not use the term "progress" in the usual sense. By "progress" they mean group members resolving the problems of one phase once and for all and then moving on to the problems of the next phase in the tradition of linear theorists (which appears to be their perspective). They seem to consider recurring problems as a form of regressive development; cyclical theorists take an opposing view.

In 1975 Braaten (7:112-129) reviewed those models in the literature "which appear to be based on substantial group experience and which are significantly original." At the start he warns the reader against confusing "cycles of concern" and recurring problems with "true phases of development." Although he does not indicate what he means by a "true phase"

of development, he appears to have rejected cyclical theory from the start. Of the 14 "significantly original" models he reviewed, three contained cyclical elements -- Mills', Bradford's and Gibb's. But he portrayed the latter two cyclical models as linear, sequential-phase models! (Braaten's treatments of Gibb and Bradford are described in more detail in the sections that deal with their models.) Further, he did not choose to review Schutz's cyclical model -- possibly one of the most "significantly original" models and certainly one of the few, to date, that has both a theory base and a great deal of hard-data to support it. Braaten devoted 10 lines to Mills' five-phase model, pronouncing the second phase "partly unique" (sic) and implying that the remaining phases were largely derivative. Braaten seems to have set out from the start to be the Scandanavian Tuckman, i.e., to create a universal model that would be linear in configuration.

The most recent classification of models was developed by Shambaugh in 1978 (20:283-295). He classified prominent models into three clusters -- recurring phase models, sequential stage models, and a third type described as a changing centrality model. His first two categories are equivalent to cyclical and linear classifications. His third type features the process of locus of control shifting from a person to the group culture -- a process common to many long-term development models, although described by the author from a new perspective. This third type is essentially a linear model with sequential phases, as Boyd, et al. have indicated (4:3).

The concept of cyclical movement in small groups continues to appear in the literature. For example, in 1979 sociologist Howard Nixon (14:45) emphasized the desirability of looking at a group as an entity having "a special character that...is presumed to include a recurring set of collective problems, or functional needs, that arise when people interact..." However, despite the currency of the idea, this writer is not aware of any major new model of group development featuring cyclical elements that has appeared in the 1970s.

Since it seemed likely that current textbooks on social psychology might be expected to describe the preferred (most academically respectable) models of group development, the writer surveyed several randomly selected texts published since 1970. Perhaps the most popular, comprehensive book (used as a textbook at Indiana University) was Shaw's Group Dynamics: The Psychology of Small Group Behavior, second edition, 1976. In its section on small-group development (pp. 97-100) the author describes two models -- Bales and Strodtbeck's 1951 model and Bennis and Shepard's 1956 linear model (which, incidentally, is miss-labeled as a sensitivity training model)*. No cyclic models from the past 25 years are included

*Bennis and Shepard's Model is a T-group model from the era when T-groups were distinctively different from what knowledgeable people now call sensitivity groups. Sensitivity groups are generally considered to focus on the individual client, whereas in the 1950s T-group experience the focus was on learning about groups as organismic entities. To consider the two types as synonomous in the context of the 1950s is to be historically inaccurate.

in this section of the book. Although Schutz's cyclic theory is described in another section of the book in another context, his group development theory is not listed in the section on models of group development. One also wonders, for example, why sociologist Theordore Mills' 1964 cyclical model was omitted, particularly since it was supported by a wealth of data, while Bennis and Shepard's oft-cited linear model -- although logically elegant -- was listed in spite of the fact that it was not supported by the data in five of the six groups in which it was tested (6:450). Four of the six groups tested actually revealed recurrent patterns of dealing with authority and intimacy problems -- ironically a characteristic associated with cyclic rather than linear models.

Lawrence Rosenfeld's 1973 textbook Human Interaction in the Small Group Setting devotes an entire chapter to developmental phases. Of the four models described, three are short-term decision-emergence models (including Bales and Strodtbeck's), and one long-term group development model is Schutz's cyclic model. Not a purely social psychology textbook, this book was written by an authority in speech/communications who made a seldom-seen, admirable attempt to bring together theory from several disciplines including social psychology.

Edwin Hollander's 1976 book, Principles and Methods of Social Psychology, describes briefly one model of group development -- Tuckman's linear model (p. 377), although no section in the book was devoted to the phenomena of group

development. Edward E. Sampson's 1971 textbook, Social Psychology and Contemporary Society, devotes six pages to group development (pp. 282-88), describing Schutz's cyclic model and Bennis and Shepard's linear model. The eight other texts of the 1970s that were examined did not present group development theory per se. These texts were organized in the modern "social problem" style, i.e., theories per se were not described and compared, but instead were selectively presented in terms of topical areas or modern problems to be illuminated. Apparently developmental group theory was not considered as sufficiently important to merit treatment. This tendency in textbooks might be a symptom of a declining interest in the area of group development.

At least in that portion of the literature which has presented and/or reviewed models of group development, the cyclic models and concepts seem to have been given "short shrift." Some editors and writers would no doubt claim that they omit cyclic models either because the models are not sufficiently supported by data or because they are products of subsystem theories. But if this is true, why do so many editors and writers continue to include Bennis and Shepard's linear model, which was not only unsupported by experimental data but is also a subsystem theory dealing with affective/ authority relations? If the present writer were a cyclical theorist he would consider raising the specter of turf

sanctions and old boy networks*.

A Conceptual Perspective

The basic idea of group development as a process of trying over and over to resolve a small number of recurring universal group process problems/issues has much in common with views of perennialist philosophers. It echoes the ideas of philosophers such as Robert M. Hutchins, who claimed that the basic problems of man are essentially the same in all times and places. His view that man has relatively few problems -- although they seem to be many because they appear in different guises -- was expressed dramatically in one of the

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*Two possible examples of scholarly "oversight" come readily to mind. The first is the work of Aubrey Fisher, who almost a decade ago updated Bales' findings on phases in decision-making groups. But his work is seldom cited by those who dominate the small group field. Fisher, a professor of speech communi-ations, published in journals in his own field and finally in book form in 1974 (9). A second example is the "evolutionary" group development model constructed by A. Cohen and R.D. Smith (8) published in 1973. Again, this work was not published in a "standard" journal and, worse yet, appeared in a soft-cover edition of a publisher whose works are directed toward practitioners, both of which reasons might help explain why many respectable academics either would not encounter the model, or, having encountered it, might consign it to obscurity. Although this model is based on a comprehensive set of explicit behaviors and is relatively more finely tuned than other models, it has been virtually ignored by reviewers and editors the past seven years. Its development seems to have required at least as much scholarly sophistication as, say, Tuchman's linear model, which has been cited and reviewed moderately often in the literature. All in all, the linear models which have appeared in the "appropriate" journals seem to have "carried the day."

assumptions undergirding the Great Books Program: within the compass of the world's 100 "great books" all of mankind's basic problems and their solutions were said to be expressed. This same idea of universal problems appearing in many different forms is fundamental to cyclical theories of group development.

A practical example will illustrate the cyclical perspective. Leland Bradford, a cyclical theorist, has said that developing groups face the same six basic problems of group life over and over, one of them being that of decision making (6:205). The question is, in what respect does decision making recur as the same basic problem in a developing group? Here is an example for the purpose of analysis:

> Session #2: the group has established a norm to help them make decisions by consensus. Taking the suggestion of two articulate participants, the group members agree rather rapidly that when suggestions are made the leader will assume a consensus to exist when no disagreement is openly expressed. (Nobody felt free enough to risk conflict by raising questions or exploring the possible consequences of the decision.)
>
> Session #5: some trust has developed and also a great deal of frustration, because some of the group's decisions have been undermined by half-hearted support by members who did not feel free enough to risk disagreeing with the decision. Finally, some participants reveal that they have been holding back and approving decisions which they wished to reject. So the group reconsiders its consensus norm. Now the group decides that to be valid, their consensus decisions must be tested-for audibly and articulated as a decision before the group can proceed further. The participants express their belief that this procedure will give them more time (a) to look for non-verbal cues of agreement/disagreement and (b) to probe each other for possible areas of disagreement that might later undermine the implementing of the decision.

In Session #2 the group had set an elementary standard for identifying consensus in order to expedite rapid decision-making and because the members were in the polite, early stage of group life and nobody wanted to disagree with the authoritative sounding participants who suggested the standard. By Session #5 the members had gained through experience a better understanding of the factors involved in making group decisions and thus changed the standard. Did the group deal with "the same basic problem" in both cases?

In one sense the group did not deal with the same problem. In Session #5 the participants were no longer interested in making rapid decisions; their motives had changed, along with their understandings of the situation. Now they were interested in (a) getting conflicting opinions expressed and (b) making valid decisions that reflected commitment. Now they desired to accommodate the decision to an optimum number of individual needs. At the nominal level of descriptive activity it might be said that the problems were similar in both cases; at the substantive level the participants' concerns about the problems of decision making were qualitatively different at the two points in time. Some cyclical theorists would be expected to respond somewhat as follows to the suggestion that the problems were substantively different:

> Certainly the problems were substantively different! When a problem recurs later in the life of a group it is recognized at a higher level of complexity. That

> is why learning occurs at a deeper level each time a problem recurs. In your example the learners discovered that reaching a consensus calls for conducting a responsible search for differences and consequences -- that this search is in the interest of the whole group and not something that only disagreeing members need worry about. And, yes, the participants had different concerns related to the problem at the two points in time. But these substantive differences do not alter the fact that the group dealt essentially with the same problem in both cases: establishing norms for decision making.

The issue boils down to an ancient argument. To which view of reality does one wish to attach priority: (a) the classical view, which supports the idea of universal recurring problems? or (b) the phenomenological view of persons like Heraclitus (who is reputed to have said that man cannot put his foot into the same river twice) and a modern writer who has said "you can't go home again?"

> Classical view: in any activity the essence of reality is that which is enduring, universal -- to be distinguished from the transitory human feelings and circumstantial differences that are mere artifacts of the experiential moment. The situational variations and perceptions we experience during an activity are not the essence of enduring reality; they are creatures of time and place and will pass away. What does endure is the essence of the activity: that part of an observed activity which reflects the "ideal form" of the activity (which existed for Aristotle as an abstract idea in the world of ideal forms). Descriptions of behavior at this level of abstraction are universal; thus, the activity "determining decision making norms" is in essence the same whenever it occurs, regardless of differences in situational circumstances.
>
> Phenomenological view: the substantive differences and the different forces operating in the situation make each experience different from all others. Thus, in our example the activity of a new group determining norms to expedite rapid decisions is, in one sense, not "the same" task or problem as a semi-developed group determining decision making norms that legitimize

> the search for conflicting views and commitments which are free from the influence of unexpressed reservations.

A consideration of the two views does raise some interesting questions. For example, are the problems of developmental group life conceptualized most effectively by using descriptors that categorize by classes of activity? Or is the substantive uniqueness of each situation so determinative that we should consider all problems as unique and thus, to some degree, incapable of being conceptualized as common to all groups?

Another way to approach the cyclical theorists' point of view is to compare it with that of the typical linear theorist. The reader should understand that aspects of the two positions as described below, as well as concepts used to characterize the two types of theories, would not apply to every theorist in either of the two traditions.

A given linear theorist might assert that as groups develop toward collaborative effectiveness and autonomy, they pass through three distinctive phases of member/trainer authority relationships: (1) a dependent phase, (2) an independent phase, and (3) an interdependent phase. Each phase would be described by the linear theorist as a distinctive time period during which members struggle with problems/issues peculiar to that phase. For the linear theorist, <u>each of the three phases would be described as posing a different set of problems</u>. Typically the developmental process would be

considered discontinuous; thus the group would have to solve the problems of one phase before it would be able to move to the problems of the next phase. If the problems of a given phase were not resolved, it would be said that the group was "stuck" or fixated in that phase and development in other problem areas would not take place.

A cyclical theorist might consider the same three stages of dependence, independence, and interdependence as differing sub-typical member responses to the same type of recurring problem -- the problem of establishing authority relations. That is, the three types of group phase problems described by the linear theorist would be seen by the cyclical theorist as one authority problem recurring in three different guises. By analogy, the linear theorist would consider the problems of desert living and arctic living as distinctively different problems, while the cyclical theorist might consider them as two manifestations of essentially the same basic problem: adapting to extreme temperatures.

Where the typical linear theorist sees the group as working on one group problem at a time and resolving it before moving on to the next problem, the typical cylical theorist assumes that <u>all</u> basic group process problems are <u>always</u> present in some degree, although only one problem at a given time is predominant (being worked on by a modal number of the group members).

Since linear theorists tend to associate each phase

with a different set of group problems/issues, they exhibit great interest in the precise identification of phase boundaries (what behaviors are critical in signaling the end of one phase and/or the beginning of a new phase?). Cyclical theorists can be less concerned with phase boundaries, perhaps because they tend to consider developmental flow as continuous -- not confined to working on only one problem in each phase. For typical cyclical theorists, group problems are not phase-specific and are not resolved once and for all at some point. Whereas linear theorists might often look for sudden changes in the group, the cyclical theorist is more likely to envision gradual changes occurring over a period of time and concurrently in several dimensions rather than in one area.

To avoid leaving the impression that the phases in all models in the linear tradition must occur in a fixed sequence, the writer wishes to state that such may not be the case. Carl Rogers' work presents a case in point (16:261-279). Rogers is careful to point out that his intent is not to present a formal model, but he does list 15 characteristic events/conditions which usually occur. The interesting thing is, he insists there is "no clear-cut sequence" (p. 263); but having denied clear-cut sequence, he goes on to describe his list of incidents as being "in roughly sequential order" (p. 263). Since he insists on "a roughly sequential order," he seems to be within the linear tradition. Essentially, if

his quasi-model were to be classified as a model it would be an example of a linear model with predictable phases that emerge in an unpredictable sequence. (See footnote 2 in the present section for related comments.)

III. CYCLICAL MODELS

From the late 1950s to the mid 1960s, the four theorists whose models are examined in this section -- Bradford, Gibb, Schutz, and Mills -- published models of group development that have been described as cyclical. Although they conceptualized the cyclical aspects of group development in somewhat different ways, the present writer considered all four models as being within the "cyclical tradition," loosely defined at the start of this study as including models that feature recurring phenomena as a prominent characteristic.

Bradford's Model*

Writers have uniformly neglected to include Leland Bradford's model in reviews of group development models, perhaps because it is sketchy and does not specify many relationships among the variables. Although characterized by brevity, its possible historic place in the early development of small group theory seems to have been overlooked. Bradford has been a respected writer and practitioner since the late 1940s and was in frequent personal contact with other major theorists of that era. Who influenced whom, and in what ways, probably will never ben known completely; studies of sources, parallels, and influences have not flourished in the

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*References to Bradford by page number only, refer to his writings in Bradford, Gibb, and Benne, T-Group Theory and Laboratory Method (1964). These writings were based on a paper he had written in 1950 or 1951 in collaboration with Thomas Mallinson, reprinted in 1958 as a chapter in Dynamics of Group Life, an N.T.L. publications not available to the present writer.

literature of group development.

Bradford's model is included here not only because it is rooted in the early era of modern group development theory, but also because Bradford himself described the development process as cyclical in nature. He rejected outright the linear-sequential theory of group development: "Group growth does not occur in a straight line" (p.205). But he presented his cyclical model as only "one way" of interpreting the T-Group development process, implying that other acceptable ways of conceptualizing group development either would also be cyclical or would take the form of some then-unknown configuration. It seems significant that he did not suggest other ways. His model describes developmental activities and changes in two dimensions of group life: (a) a group problem dimension and (b) an affective dimension.

(a) On the group problem dimension, the group tries repeatedly to resolve six basic, recurring problems of group life -- sometimes indirectly through performing tasks that are not directly related to the resolving of a given "basic problem." As the group members continue to confront the same basic problems, participant understanding of the group's problems and needs is said to occur at increasing depth. The six basic problems of group life are (p. 205):

- problems of relationship to authority
- problems of interpersonal distance and relationship
- problems of goal formation
- problems of decision making
- problems of norm setting
- problems of communication

(b) On the affective dimension, as the group develops it cycles through four alternating phases: dissatisfaction, satisfaction, dissatisfaction, satisfaction (p. 205). A possible alternative interpretation of the number of affective phases is presented later in this essay. The model is illustrated in Figure 1:

Fig. I. An Illustration of Brodford's Cyclical Model



The dynamics of group movement up the spiral appear to be as follows. The participants encounter and try unsuccessfully to resolve one (or perhaps several) of the

six group problems. As they struggle, frustration builds and new understanding of their needs emerge so that the members reach a boiling point of dissatisfaction with their present practices. Then the group members -- through feedback, diagnosis of the situation, and the development of new relationships with each other -- decide on relatively new, more satisfactory ways of dealing with the basic problem being confronted. These changes usher in a period of "satisfaction" which lasts for a while. Then the cycle is repeated. Bradford has described this problem-resolving process elsewhere in terms of four formal phases*.

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*Bradford has more recently (5:4-12) described the cycle in terms of four tasks, or phases, which delineate the dynamics through which groups grow by solving the basic problems of group life. It is the recurring of this cycle that is said to produce group development: (1) initial group formation and initial movement, (2) confronting a difficult problem [presumably one of the six basic group problems], (3) overcoming the problem through cooperative problem solving, (4) group reorganization of strucutre and function. Groups are said "to go through these phases over and over again; each time, hopefully, at a slightly deeper level." Bradford assumes that the group becomes a new group each time it solves a basic problem adequately enough to allow the group to move on. Thus each interim solution leads to group reformation, then to a new confrontation with another problem ("boiling point of dissatisfaction"), and the four-phase cycle repeats. It should be pointed out that the group members are consciously involved in the planned resolving of group problems only in the second and third phases of Bradford's repetitive four-phase cycle. These two phases simply summarize the age-old problem-solving process: (1) recognizing/confronting the problem and (2) solving the problem. Obviously, the latter step could be further elaborated into subphases by substituting either Bales' or Fisher's model of phases in problem-solving.

Bradford believes that the primary motivation for group development originates in the members' dissatisfaction with outmoded organizational forms that prevent them from using their new understandings of group process and from meeting new needs, both of which are constantly changing in the training group situation. It appears to this writer that although the motive force that fuels development might well originate in participant dissatisfaction, there are necessary instrumental conditions which include both (a) a modicum of freedom to change the group organization and (b) a lack of centralized leadership. These conditions are, of course, present in many group development training programs, but not in workaday, ordinary groups. It is well to remember that Bradford's model was based on T-Groups.

Bradford's major group problems apparently recur in a random order (probably within each dissatisfaction phase). This random recurrence of group problems presents a dilemma. Some persons would interpret their recurrence as cyclical phenomena; those who consider regularity and ordered recurrence as criteria would term it quasi-cyclical. The affective phases are classically cyclical in their recurrence, as is Bradford's formal, four-phase recurring cycle of steps through which the members are said to resolve the six basic problems of group life. Bradford did not identify these steps as phases, but each does seem to be a distinctive

subperiod. And even though the length of the cycle of phases and the regularity of its recurrence are unpredictable, it does appear to exemplify cyclical dynamics.

Developmental flow appears to be continuous as one would expect in a cyclical model. If Bradford's developmental flow were discontinuous, we would have to assume that one or more of the "basic group problems" was resolved once and for all at the conclusion of the first dissatisfaction phase. Since Bradford did not report such a phenomenon, and since he stated that the same problems were confronted again and again, we must assume that developmental flow is continuous, and therefore that all six basic problems continue to recur throughout the entire development process -- a familiar concept among cyclical theorists.

Bradford affirmed that groups can become immobilized, and he states they are most likely to become frozen "at some point of satisfaction" (p. 205). Bradford's words "at some point of satisfaction" imply the existence of several periods of satisfaction. This implication conflicts with his literal description which specifies the existence of only two such periods: he says that groups proceed "from dissatisfaction to satisfaction to dissatisfaction to satisfaction" (p. 205). If he did mean to specify four affective periods, as he stated, then his assertion that groups often become frozen "at some point of satisfaction" is curious

indeed, because it is possible for the group to become "frozen" only in the first of the two periods of satisfaction, since the second period of satisfaction represents the final desired state -- the satisfaction that comes with optimal development. Thus it seems evident that groups are likely to become bogged down only in the first of his two periods of satisfaction. An alternative interpretation is that Bradford's description is somewhat ambiguous; that he tried to suggest the existence of numerous alternating phases of satisfaction/dissatisfaction by listing only two complete cycle. If this was his intent, then Figure 1 in this essay should be expanded vertically to suggest the existence of an unknown number of phases in the spiral.

Bennis and Shepard's views of when groups are most likely to founder differ from Bradford's view. Since both models were products of considerable experience with T-Groups this disparity is an interesting issue. Bennis and Shepard assert (2:427) that the group is most likely to become stuck in their subphase two, which seems to be included in Bradford's first phase of member dissatisfaction -- apparently a subperiod featuring power struggles in both models. Bradford, as noted above, said that groups are most likely to get stuck during his first phase of member satisfaction -- a phase corresponding to Bennis and Shepard's subphase four and the latter part of subphase three. These two views are obviously poles apart. One view claims groups become fixated in a fight phase and the

other claims it usually occurs during a phase of member satisfaction, or harmony (Bennis and Shepard would call it "flight").

Bennis and Shepard listed three major reasons for blockage of development in their subphase two (period of member dissatisfaction):

- the trainer's avoidance of introducing explicit consideration of group dependency
- a dearth of independently-oriented group members
- leaders of opposing subgroups being the most assertive persons in the group and prolonging the strife ad infinitum.

Bradford did not elaborate the basis for his observation that groups tend to become stuck in a period of satisfaction. The present writer believes the opposing views might be accounted for by the circumstances in which the theorists secured their data. Bradford's experience was mainly with T-Groups in residential group life laboratory settings in which groups met day after day, generating a great deal of intensity. In these settings group members could be expected to enter the familiar period of strife relatively soon, to work through it, and to enter a satisfaction phase which might seem like a haven of refuge and which members would be eager to preserve, thus becoming "stuck." However, Bennis and Shepard's group situations stand in sharp contrast.

We know they used student groups in a university classroom setting, meeting presumably once a week for the period of one semester. The professor-trainer was an academic judge with different power over members than a stranger-trainer in a residential setting. Inevitably there would have been considerable loss of continuity and intensity between sessions. And finally, one would expect few student groups to complete Bennis and Shepard's first three subphases, since it would require them to revolt openly against the professor. Thus it does not seem surprising that Bennis and Shepard wrote (2:428, f.n.) "It is not uncommon for groups to remain throughout the course in this phase" -- that is, stuck in subphase two, the period of counter-dependent struggle.

Bradford's sequence of the satisfaction/dissatisfaction phases is also interesting from the comparative perspective. The sequence of his phases is relatively parallel to that of the six subphases in Bennis and Shepard's linear model. Bennis and Shepard's subphases are listed on the left, with Bradford's corresponding affective phases in parentheses. Bennis and Shepard's subphase descriptors are taken from Bennis's revised version of the model (6:260, 268):

Dependence flight - - - - - - - - - - (dissatisfaction)

Counter-dependence flight

Resolution-catharsis

Enchantment-flight - - - - - - - (satisfaction)

Disenchantment-flight - - - - - - - (dissatisfaction)

Consensual validation - - - - - - - (satisfaction)

Bennis and Shepard's subphases are collapsed into the appropriate analogous phases of Bradford's model to illustrate the close parallel between the two sequences.

Although Bradford's phases of member dissatisfaction/satisfaction correspond fairly closely to the conditions described in Bennis and Shepard's subphases, it must be noted that the latter writers do not speak of member dissatisfaction as a motive force in development. In their subphases one and two, and for most of subphase three, they describe the members' fears, frustrations, and anxiety, which almost certainly are causes of member dissatisfaction. But they describe these factors as natural effects of the ambiguous, normless situation of a training group rather than as factors which cause group development. In fact, Bennis and Shepard identify two other situational factors (6:427) as the major causes of "group movement" during this period: the trainer's failure to provide leadership for the dependent group and the presence of some members who are assertively independent.

Bradford was less interested in describing situational factors that produce group movement and more interested in conceptualizing the force that impels group growth or development. The distinction between group movement and group development is significant in the context of the relationship of these factors to member dissatisfaction. For Bradford member dissatisfaction with the group's present practices and norms in the light of newly-emerging under-

standings was the force that impelled group development, which he defined in terms of a learning outcome: increased ability to face up to process problems and to devise methods to solve them.

There is no direct evidence that Bennis and Shepard considered group movement (locomotion) as synonymous with group development, but it is interesting to note that they emphasized the role of the trainer and the personality mix of the group members as decisive elements in the group's progress, while Bradford emphasized the group development experience as a learning process. He sought to conceptualize causation in the context of internal group factors -- the learner's actions and motives rather than in terms of the trainer's instrumental actions. One gets the impression that Bradford's perspective was that of an educator seeking answers to problems of collaborative learning -- reaching quality outcomes, while Bennis and Shepard were more concerned with describing the dynamics of the group in terms of authority relations and interpersonal member alliances. Both views are, of course, valuable.

Bradford disagrees also with Bennis and Shepard's thesis that groups resolve the authority problem before dealing with the intimacy problem. Evidence of his disagreement lies in (1) his belief that all six basic problems continue to recur throughout the entire life of the group, and (2) his failure to specify priorities to the six basic group problems.

Of course, one would expect a cyclical theorist to disagree basically on these matters, whereas linear theorists such as Bennis and Shepard would tend to see the authority problem as discontinuous and as being resolved at a given point, at which time a single new problem would emerge -- intimacy. The cyclical theorist sees basic problems as continuous, and the emerging of the intimacy problem and its resolution in interdependent relations as another manifestation (under a different guise) of the original authority/dependency problem. These differences between cyclical and linear theorists will be discussed in more detail in the final section of this study.

Another interesting aspect of Bradford's skeletal theory is his idea of the kind of evidence that demonstrates proof of group development. He defined development in terms of (a) the group's increasing readiness to face up to the six basic problems of group life and (b) the improvement of methods by which the group approaches the problems. It is significant that he did not specify actual solutions to the group problems as proof of development. He also indicated that groups can develop only if their members are learning, thus affirming that individual and group development are interdependent; but he did <u>not</u> think of "individual growth" as the defining attribute of group development. The test of group development was, for him, a group product: <u>the</u>

improving of group-determined means of facilitating the solving of basic group problems.

One wishes that Bradford had described in more detail the theory supporting his model. Many questions arise. For example: (a) Are all six basic problems dealt with during each of the dissatisfaction phases? (b) Are certain problems characteristically worked at covertly and others openly? (c) Are all six problems equally important to the group's development in both dissatisfaction phases? (d) Is there some roughly identifiable order of problem recurrence? (e) What is the comparative length of the affective phases? Bradford reveals a partial answer to question (b) by stating that when T-Group participants haggle over issues of seeming unimportance, the struggle is not over the expressed issues but over the underlying issue of leadership power and its implications for the personal safety of the persons involved.

What is vital, but missing in Bradford's theory is a set of propositions that describe the relationship of the six problem variables to each other and to predictable patterns of problem resolution. The absence of these propositions from a writer of such broad experience and knowledge suggests his belief that no verifiable patterns exist. Yet he did offer some meager clues. The following two selectively edited paragraphs summarize Bradford's description (pp. 206-208) of the early sessions of a training group. From this description we can identify the dynamics of the first

"dissatisfaction phase" and also an alternative first "satisfaction phase" for some groups.

> From the start there is some anxiety over lack of structure and finding one's place in the group. Usually an individual or a small subgroup exerts early control and the group quickly develops some structure and tentative norms concerning acceptable topics and how to proceed. Soon the group faces a problem that it cannot handle adequately. The problem may stem from any number of situations, such as a threat to a previously established norm, a sharp attack on someone's ideas, or competition between those seeking leadership. Or perhaps the group polarized over an issue it can't resolve. All or part of the group becomes immobilized. Then the group tries to place the blame on someone -- often the trainer, but sometimes a group member; there is much "scape goating" as the group searches for causes.
>
> An alternative reaction to group immobilization occurs if the group installs new rules, a more structured approach -- criteria for selecting topics, time limits for talking, rotating leadership, etc. This early solution is flight from dealing with the group problems for awhile. If the group continues to deal with the real process problems, the members usually learn to analyze their group data and to take joint action to solve their basic group problems.

The above description summarizes what is probably, for some groups, Bradford's first cycle of dissatisfaction/satisfaction phases. The present writer believes that the second dissatisfaction phase would begin when the group became dissatisfied with the somewhat artificial, highly structured situation and decided to attack the process problems at deeper levels than they had done up to that point. The second satisfaction phase would begin when the group had resolved the basic problems sufficiently enough to allow the members to work together comfortably as inter-

dependent individuals working toward mutual goals, signalling the maturity of collaborative teamwork.

Although Cohen and Smith (8:159) classified Bradford as a cyclical theorist, at least two writers have interpreted Bradford as a linear theorist who advocated the existence of sequential discontinuous phases. Tuckman (23:391-393) seems to have believed that Bradford meant to advocate a five-phase linear model in two essays (6:136-67; 190-215). However, in neither of these essays did Bradford use the term phase or stage. In fact, he seems to have been very careful to avoid using any such terms. In one of the essays Bradford did describe 6 critical incidents taken from several different T-Groups in order to present a picture of a T-Group in action. From these representative incidents Tuckman seems to have inferred the existence of a 5-phase model. From reading precisely the same essay, Braaten (7:16) later inferred that Bradford had advocated six linear phases! Both Tuckman and Braaten were in the throes of developing their own linear models at the time they interpreted Bradford as a linear theorist.

Additional aspects of Bradford's model are compared with those of Gibb's and Schutz's models in the sections devoted to those theorists.

Gibb's Model*

Jack Gibb's 1964 model derived from research he started in the late 1930's, much of his data coming from T-Groups in the 1950's. He rejected the idea of linear development because he could not, to his full satisfaction, identify discrete interim phases of development, although he did affirm that consistent sequential changes in groups could be observed, cross-sectionally, over a span of time (p. 289). Although he reported that some groups change through dramatic, unpredictable spurts, he also noted that "some groups" develop in cyclic or spiral form with movement "back and forth" across the critical dimensions of group life (p. 289). It is his formulation of these critical dimensions that is the heart of his concept of group development.

Gibb's model does not describe specific phases as distinctive time periods or specify a sequence of affective states during the process of development. Instead it describes a hierarchy of four dimensions of personal and group growth that develop optimally in a fixed order to produce personal and group growth. These four dimensions of individual and group change are called "primary modal concerns" -- "problems with which the greatest number of group members are concerned at a given time of analysis" (p. 281). Gibb also

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*Unless designated otherwise, the page references to Gibb's writings will come from Bradford, Gibb, and Benne, T-Group Theory and Laboratory Method (1964), 279-298. Gibb's chapter in Bugental, Challenges of Humanistic Psychology (1967), 161-170, was used as a supplement. The outline of Dimensions of Group and Personal Growth (Figure 2) includes material from both the 1964 and 1967 texts.

described the four modal concerns as continually recurring themes or processes in all groups (p. 281). The four concerns are listed here in the left column of Figure 2:

Fig. 2 GIBB'S DIMENSIONS OF GROUP AND PERSONAL GROWTH

Primary Modal Concerns	Signs or Directions of Personal Growth	Signs or Directions of Group Growth
1. Acceptance (membership)	Acceptance of self Acceptance of others	climate of trust, support
2. Data Flow (decision making)	Openness, flow of feelings, opinions and perceptions	open communication, valid feedback, dealing with conflict, consensual decision making
3. Goal-formation (productivity)	Goal integration in self; self-determination; self-assessment	goal integration in group; group determination and assessment of goals
4. Control (organization)	Interdependence (inner control and value system)	interdependence; emergent role and norm systems

The extent to which the group develops on each dimension depends upon the amount of growth in each of the dimensions higher in the hierarchy. For example, the amount of authentic data-flow, or open communication of ideas and feelings (2nd level), will depend largely on the amount of trust in self and others that exists (1st level); and integration of individual goals into valid group goals (3rd level) can occur only as rapidly as both trust and open, valid communication have developed.

A basic question in Gibb's theory is: does the group develop on one level of modal concern at a time (i.e., the

highest-level unresolved concern)? Or, does growth occur on several levels at the same time? The writer believes Gibb meant the latter, as will be demonstrated later. However, the former interpretation is considered as a possible alternative, since at least one theorist has interpreted Gibb's model as linear-sequential (7:112-29). The case for Gibb as a linear theorists follows.

Gibb asserted several times his belief in the fixed order in which groups resolve their major process concerns; this idea was reflected in his hierarchy of four modal concerns, which he called the "basic order of development" (p. 283). At one point he makes the crucial statement that the basic order of development is "often camoflaged" (p. 283). A possible implication is that the group members will continue to work at resolving Level 1 (acceptance) concerns until they are completely or sufficiently resolved, even though at the level of explicit, manifest-content the group might <u>appear</u> to be working at Level 3 (trying to set valid group goals). Gibb mentions what might be called a displacement process* whereby "the basic order of development is often camoflaged" (p. 283). That is, "often" a group will work at, say, Level 3 concerns, but will not thereby resolve them because the

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*What I have called Gibb's displacement process (which produces a "camoflaged" order of development) is notably analogous to a process Bradford mentioned whereby the group is said to work sometimes at resolving a "basic group problem" by working on topical tasks that are not directly related to the resolving of the problem.

activity is used only as a means of continuing to attack the unresolved concerns of Level 1. In the context of this displacement process, it could be said that the group works only nominally at Level 3 concerns but substantively at the highest level of unresolved concerns. If this displacement process occurs "often" enough , the implication is that when groups "move back and forth" across the four dimensions, the movement is at the nominal level. Thus the group would only appear to be dealing substantively with the recurring "concerns" or problems.

In another passage Gibb indicates that the concerns arise in this order: acceptance, data-flow, goal formation, and control and that development of each factor in this order seems to facilitate subsequent of the other factors (p. 283).

The implications of this interpretation are serious. From the perspective of the order of optimal resolution of "substantive concerns" Gibb's model could be considered equivalent to a linear sequential model featuring discontinuous developmental flow. And from the nominal task perspective it could be described as a quasi-cyclical model featuring recurrent engagements with all four modal concerns. Thus, at the substantive level, the development process would be considered (a) discontinuous (since certain concerns must be resolved before others can be attacked), but (b) continuous at the nominal level of manifest tasks. With respect to

emerging task patterns, since the order in which nominal tasks emerge seems to be random, the developmental pattern for each group would be unique (i.e., idiomorphic). Since the substantive concerns and tasks would emerge and be resolved in a fixed order, the developmental pattern for all groups at the substantive level could be described as isomorphic.

Obviously the amount of importance one attaches to Gibb's displacement process ("camoflaged" order of development) and to the constancy of its operation are major factors in interpreting the nature of developmental flow in his model. The process obviously could be used to lend a great deal of support to the idea that groups resolve modal concerns one at a time in a hierarchical order. But the displacement process would have to operate almost constantly rather than "often" in order to support fully this first interpretation of Gibb's flow. One wishes that detecting the displacement process in operation did not depend wholly on inferences drawn by the observer, but such is the case since the process is executed unknowingly by the group members and is thus a creature of the observer's interpretation. It is significant that Gibb himself did not emphasize the operation of this process. He also did not elaborate on his time-reference, "often."

The second interpretation of Gibb's developmental flow probably explains his intent more accurately. In nominal/

substantive terms, when the group works nominally at resolving one of the four concerns, if the problem-resolving activity causes substantive progress in resolving higher order concerns, the group is simultaneously making substantive progress in resolving the "nominal concern." The fact is that the "concerns" which might appear to be nominal are not always purely nominal. All four dimensions are interdependent and growth across dimensions is reciprocal. Thus growth can occur on multiple dimensions simultaneously. The group continues to develop a little at a time on several dimensions, so long as growth on any given lower dimension of the hierarchy contributes to growth in the highest unresolved dimension. It is optimal resolution of the modal concerns that occurs in a fixed order, not the developmental problem-resolving activities. As a matter of fact, Gibb himself said (p. 283) that growth of social structure occurs as "concurrent and interdependent development on each of the four dimensions. . . ."

Another basic factor argues for the probability of this interpretation: in his 1967 refinement of the 1964 model (Bugental, pp. 161-170), Gibb emphasized more heavily the importance of and existence of degrees of reciprocal trust, feedback, goal directionality, and interdependence as yardsticks of group maturity in the four dimensions; his reference to concurrent growth in the dimensions indicates clearly that growth in some degree occurs incrementally across multiple dimensions so long as the key variable, trust,

continues to grow.

To summarize the most likely interpretation of Gibb's developmental flow: group development is a continuous process that is concurrent on multiple levels (of the four basic concerns) to the extent that growth continues to occur in the highest level unresolved concern. Although Gibb's concerns, or dimensions dependent on growth on higher dimensions -- the model can not be classified as featuring discontinuous flow in the classic sense, because no single dimension (concern, or problem) must be completely resolved in order for the group to continue its development. However, it should be emphasized that the entire development process does depend on some initial growth in resolving the initial acceptance concern. Thus there is the possibility of discontinuity at that point, i.e., the problem of complete distrust must be overcome if development is even to begin. Figure 3 illustrates the order in which the concerns are resolved:

Fig 3 The Order in Which Modal Concerns are Resolved



Figure 4 is an attempt to illustrate Gibb's cyclical movement of developmental flow back and forth across the critical dimensions of group life during the development process:

Fig. 4 An Interpretation of Gibb's Developmental Flow



The solid line indicates the flow of the group's substantive concerns back and forth across the dimensions. The broken lines indicate that the group does deal with all four concerns from the start, but that during this period (mainly in the earlier sessions, until trust and data flow develop), some involvement on lower dimensions is quasi-nominal, with a modicum of growth (resolution of concerns) taking place on the lower dimensions to the extent that involvement there fosters growth in the higher, unresolved dimensions.

All this movement implies that the developing group is constantly trying to resolve the four group concerns. This constant effort to try to resolve basic process problems raises a question about the fluctuating levels of satisfaction

in Gibb's groups. Both Bradford and Bennis and Shepard reported periods of satisfaction in their models of T-Group development, but Gibb does not include affective phenomena as basic ingredients in his model, although his model was also meant to apply to T-Groups. Gibb seems to have focused his efforts on identifying the key problem elements of group development and in determining their developmental relationships. In this context, he seems to have considered affective reactions of group members simply as concomitant effects of problem-resolving activities, not as causative factors impelling group movement, as Bradford had indicated.

Gibb did not have a direct, unambiguous answer to the question, "what motivates development?" Bradford -- as we have seen -- attributed the motivation to members' dissatisfaction in the context of their growing understandings and changing needs. Gibb did indicate that modal concerns generate "intrinsic" forces that reduce the concerns and produce personal and group movement. Although he does not describe the specific nature of these intrinsic forces, a perusal of his writings leads one to suspect that the "intrinsic forces" are identified with a universal need for "defense reduction" -- for trust -- perhaps the most basic assumption of his modal concerns theory. He considered fear and distrust as the major sources of dysfunctional operation. The major signs of ill health in a group can be classified under his four dimensions (26:161-170):

(1) Acceptance: fear, lack of self-acceptance and distrust of other group members are effects of unresolved acceptance/membership concerns. These promote facade-building and feelings of inadequacy.

(2) Data-flow: lack of open, valid communication causes concern about decision making. Ambiguity, distortion of communications, and polite dishonesty are some products of this unresolved concern.

(3) Goals: group goals which do not integrate individual goals members consider important cause a basic concern over group productivity. Apathy, flight, suspicion and low commitment are some signs of an unresolved basic concern for productivity.

(4) Control: unresolved dependency, counter-dependency, power struggles, and hostility are signs of the unresolved concern for organization in the group.

A comparison of Gibb's modal concerns and Bradford's basic group problems shows remarkable agreement. In the outline below, Bradford's problems (which arise randomly during development) are listed in the order which demonstrates their approximate congruence with Gibb's concerns:

Gibb's Hierarchy of Modal Concerns	Bradford's Basic Group Problems
Acceptance	problems of interpersonal distance and relationship
Data-flow	problems of decision making problems of communication
Goal Formation	problems of goal formation
Control	problems of norm setting problems of relationship to authority

For all practical purposes Gibb's "concerns" translate rather well into Bradford's "problems." The close relationship of the two sets of concepts if indicated as follows:

Acceptance: Gibb included the concept of self-acceptance which Bradford did not consider; both writers emphasized the need for establishing interpersonal relationships. For Gibb, resolving the problems of Bradford's "interpersonal distance and relationship" meant the development of trust. Bradford's "problems of interpersonal distance and relationship" might be also involved in Gibb's "control" concern, since Gibb lists interdependent relations as a sign of resolution of control conerns (See Fig. 2).

Data-flow: Two of Bradford's six basic problems fit Gibb's data-flow area; these two parallel the two characteristics Gibb listed as signs of growth in resolving the data-flow concern: open communication and consensus decision making (See Fig. 2).

Goal Formation: Both writers used precisely the same term; no writers before or since have used it, so far as I can discover. Nor have other writers on group development given group goals such a central place in their models.

Control: Two of Bradford's basic problems fit into Gibb's control area; both of Bradford's problems reflect Gibb's "norms" and "interdependent relations," which he listed as signs of growth in resolving the control concern (See Fig. 2).

Both Gibb and Bradford also agree with the concept that a group continues to deal with essentially the same recurring basic problems throughout the entire course of development, although Bradford did not posit a fixed order in which the problems were optimally resolved. Both writers described the developmental process as cyclic in form. However, since the group problems do not recur regularly or in a recognizable sequence in either model, it seems more accurate to describe problem recurrence as quasi-cyclic in both models.

It is no surprise that Gibb lists the resolution of the "group goal concern" at the third level in his 4-level hierarchy. Although self-analytic training groups usually exhibit some concern over group goals in their early sessions, the issue is seldom resolved until much later. As early as 1956, in the Bennis and Shepard model, the resolution of the group goal issue was reported as occurring in sub-phase 5 of a six-sub-phase model (11:280). A more significant question might be: why did group theorists in the 1950's and early 1960's (22:122-125) attach more significance to group goals than have later theorists? It might be revealing to test the hypothesis that a greater number of the earlier group theorists tended to conceive of the group as an organic structural whole. Later theorists have tended to emphasize the individuals in the group -- so-called molecular issues and processes. Group goal issues were -- and perhaps still are -- of more interest to sociologically-oriented

investigators than to the clinically-oriented group therapists, psychiatrists, and psychologists, who have tended to dominate group development theory since the mid 1960's (3:107).

In the context of Gibb's concept of continuous developmental flow on all four hierarchical dimensions, only a small part of the fourth dimension (control, or normative structure) is determined during the final developmental activity -- that is, after goal-formation concerns have been optimally resolved. Thus curiosity prompts one to wonder about the nature of these "final" developmental activities. What norms of control are finally developed to the optimum level? Presumably these norms would be shared expectations for controlling interdependent member relations, since Gibb lists interdependence as one of his "signs" of group growth in the control area. If the final activity is the resolving of intimacy concerns which lead to the establishing of norms that promote interdependent relationships, then Gibb's model is parallel in that respect to Schutz's model, which is reviewed later in this study.

At least one writer -- Bratten (7:116) -- has described Gibb's model as being essentially linear, with discontinuous sequential phases, rather than cyclical with continuous developmental flow. Braaten apparently interpreted Gibb's model in accordance with my interpretation #1, presented

earlier in this section. That Braaten confused Gibb's four dimensions of group life with distinctive, discrete phases is not surprising, since he appears to believe that true group development can be manifested only through sequential discontinuous phases. In fact, he explicitly warns the reader against confusing developmental phases with recurring cycles of concern, which is, of course, a basic concept in Gibb's model. Braaten completely misunderstood Gibb's hierarchy of four concerns by assuming they were phases. For example, since Gibb lists norm development last in his hierarchy of concerns, Braaten assumed it meant that groups do not develop norms until near the end of the entire development process! Thus it is clear that Braaten did not understand Gibb's concepts of interdependent concerns and continuous developmental flow, which allow norms to develop from the start to the degree that other dimensions of the hierarchy also develop.

Schutz's Model*

William Schutz's model of group development is part of his comprehensive theory of interpersonal relations, which attempts to account for the formation and development of all

*References to Schutz appear by page number only, indicating the source as his book The Interpersonal Underworld (Science and Behavior Books, 1966).

types of social relationships including dyads. This essay focuses on his model of group development, with emphasis on his concepts of phases, cyclical recurrence, and the nature of developmental flow.

Schutz described group formation and development as a process in which the group members attempt to resolve three kinds of basic problems of interaction: problems of Inclusion, problems of Control, and problems of Affection. He referred to these three problem areas also as "primary interpersonal concerns" and as "need areas." His occasional use of the term "need areas" reflects three hypotheses which support his model of group development: (1) that each individual has inclusion needs, control needs, and affection needs, (2) that the nature and strength of these needs have been determined largely by childhood relationships with significant others, and (3) that patterns of interpersonal relations in groups can be described in terms of the three individual needs -- togetherness, control and affection.

In Schutz's model three recurring problem phases of group development are said to occur in a fixed order -- I.C.A. -- and, in long-term groups, are said to continue to recur in the same order until the members become aware of impending group termination, at which point the three-phase cycle reverses, A.C.I. Thus the total life of a group is summarized as having a formation/development sequence and a termination sequence: ICAICA. . .ACI. Schutz's life-stage

description of group development was apparently the first of this type in the literature. Even up to the present time, most other models have described some desired state of group maturity or task effectiveness as the final phase of group development.*

The following description of Schutz's ICA phases summarizes the essential dynamics of each phase. The descriptions were adapted directly from Schutz's text (pp. 169-71):

1. Inclusion phase: group members try to establish their personal identity in the group, seeing how others react and how they themselves can fit in. "Goblet issues" -- group decisions or issues which are in themselves of minor importance -- are seized on as "glasses" or vehicles through the discussion of which members can "size up" each other. The issue of commitment is also present: how much of myself will I give? How important to me is the task of this group? Do I want to be in or out of the group? The problems of inclusion generate individual-centered behavior such as withdrawal, overtalking, and exhibitionism.

2. Control phase: Control problems become dominant after problems of inclusion have been sufficiently resolved to allow the group to move on. Now the issue

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*Schutz's termination sequence is described in the section of this paper devoted to Mills' model, where the termination sequences of both writers are compared.

of appropriate decision-making procedures emerges, along with the problems of how to share responsibility and the distribution of power. Competition and a struggle for leadership are characteristic. The primary anxieties in this phase are related to persons believing they have too much or too little influence and responsibility.

3. Affection phase: Problems of affection become salient after a satisfactory resolution of the control problems. Now the members' primary anxieties are related to the threat of having too much or too little intimacy to meet individual needs and accomplish the task of the group. Each person tries to establish the most comfortable position for himself regarding giving and receiving affection.

Schutz's recurring-phase rotation (ICAICA...) and his statements of formal principles do not seem to be congruent with the dynamics of development which he describes in detail later in his text. For example, his "Principle of Integration" (p. 168) implies that groups spend most of their time dealing with an I, a C, or an A problem:

"For the time period starting with the group's beginning until three intervals before the group's termination the predominant area of interaction begins with inclusion, is followed by control, and finally by affection."

(Underlining mine.) Schutz seems to imply that all groups always spend most of their time dealing with ICA problems. It would seem more logical to assert that the group is always in a period in which one of the three problem areas is the predominant problem area of interaction. This interpretation is supported by Schutz's implication that developmental flow actually includes problem-free periods of group task activity which are interrupted periodically when a "problem area" emerges into salience. Schutz's wheel-changing/bolt-tightening analogy (pp. 171-172) makes this interpretation fairly clear:

> ". . .And, finally, each bolt is gone over separately to secure it fast. In a way similar to the bolts, the need areas are worked on until they are handled satisfactorily enough [to enable the group] to continue with the work at hand. . . . If one bolt was not tightened well on the first sequence, on the next cycle it must receive more attention, and so on." (Underlining mine.)

"The work at hand" is obviously task related content seen as being distinct from group problem-resolving activities.

Figure 5 illustrates one way of picturing three dimensions of Schutz's developmental flow with respect to how the problems become salient and interrupt the "work at hand," the normal task activity of the group:

Fig 5



Figure 5 illustrates the periodic interruption of normal task activity by the three kinds of problems that emerge into group salience. Obviously the Inclusion problems are the "predominant" problems in the illustration, showing that the group is in an "inclusion phase." Dimension (3) in the figure illustrates the actions of individuals for whom one problem area is so personally prepotent that it "will transcend the current group issue" (p. 171). These persons continually try to resolve the one personally prepotent problem area throughout all sessions, and are said to remain basically unaffected by group interaction.

There is one aspect of Schutz's theory that anthologists of group development seem to avoid describing in much detail -- perhaps because it is fraught with ambiguity. He uses the word phase to signify at least two different phenomena: (1) any one of the three problem areas when it becomes salient, and (2) a larger time period in which all three problem areas become intermittently salient buy only one is predominant. He appears to have conceptualized the group formation/development portion of a group's life in three "stages" which he later referred to as "phases." For example in Theorem 4-1 (p. 179) Schutz says that if a group is high on inclusion compatibility but low on control and affection, "the

group members will be most compatible during the initial stages of their relation;" that under different conditions the group will be most compatible "during the middle stages of their relations;" and under other conditions, most compatible "during the last stages of their relation prior to the separation sequence." (Underlining mine.) Here Schutz seems to be picturing three large time periods in the life of a group: a period of "initial stages" presumably with inclusion problems predominant; one of "middle stages" with control problems predominant; and one of "last stages" prior to dissolution, with affection problems predominant.

In another passage (p. 173) Schutz says "In another . . .group during the middle phase, which could reasonably be called the control phase. . ..*" (Underlining mine.) It should be noted that he does not say "during the middle phases;" clearly he was thinking of the middle phase, meaning that only three phases exist prior to the separation sequence. Thus he appears to describe group formation and development as a three-phase (or stage?) operation.

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*Here we note the use of the word "phase" as singular; he also used the plural term "stages." Sometimes it is difficult to know whether the two words refer to (a) a single recurrence of a problem, i.e., an I, aC, or an A, (b) a complete ICA cyle, or (c) a series of ICA cycles.

Graphically it could be represented in this way:

Initial stages (phase) of development	Middle stages (phase) of development	Latter stages (phase) of development
IcaIca... predominant problems related to Inclusion	iCaiCa... predominant problems related to Control	icAicA... predominant problems related to Affection

aci
dissolution sequence

This interpretation of the dynamics is given substantial support by three related concepts articulated by Schutz:

(1) All three problem areas are always present but not of equal salience (p. 171).

(2) The unresolved parts of problems arising in earlier phases persist residually during subsequent phases (p. 180).

(3) All three problems are being worked on in varying degrees, one being predominant (p. 179).

These three ideas are akin to Gibb's idea that all four "modal concerns" are always present and that the partial resolving of one concern expedites the resolving of the other concerns. The two writers differed on the nature, the number, and the hierarchical ordering of the concerns/problem areas. However, Schutz's idea that I.C.A. problems are always present and continue to recur throughout the life of a group is supported in significant ways by passages from Bradford's writings. In fact, Bradford's rationale for the concept of recurring group problems seems more convincing than Schutz's. The following passages present Bradford's rationale (6:198,

199, 200, 205) that supports Schutz's contention that "inclusion problems" continue to recur:

- "East individual works on the problem of how much he will invest of himself throughout most of the T-Group. . . Even after initial decisions. . .to invest, there are continuous charges in the membership contract for each individual."
- "The stress over problems of individual identity and of group survival is never relieved once and for all, because new events present new threats."

Obviously Bradford has described major elements in what Schutz called "inclusion problems" -- the decision of how much of self to invest and concern for individual identity.

In the next quotation Bradford describes group members' other unspoken questions which arise at the start of the development process (that is, during Schutz's inclusion phase):

> "As in any other group he is asking: How important is this group to me?. . . What gain. . .at what price. . . may I expect? How close do I want to be to these people?" (Underlining mine.)

Here it is significant that Bradford describes as occurring in the early phase not only typical Schutzian inclusion problems, but also a manifestation of Schutz's affection problem. This evidence tends to confirm Schutz's assertion that all three problems (inclusion, control, and affection) exist in all phases (assuming, of course, that Bradford's

examples of member-to-self dialogue are based on hard data).

In the following passage Bradford describes a basis for confirming what Schutz would call recurring control problems:

> "The group task shifts each day as different individuals take focal positions, and the group reforms to meet the new task. Efforts to control the group come from various people and in different guises, each presenting different problems."

Clearly, the foregoing passages from Bradford's writings tend to support Schutz's basic assertion that ICA problems continue to recur throughout the entire life of a group.

One way to objectify Schutz's model would be a spiral configuration portraying the recurring cycles of ICA problem-resolving activities. The circled letters indicate which problem is predominant.

Fig 6 Cyclical Flow in Three Phases of Schutz's Life Cycle Model



Since Schutz did not specifically identify an individual process for resolving the three kinds of residual problems, we are led to assume that all ICA problem-resolving activities are group activities -- that is, tasks involving group members working collectively. Later this concept will be examined in more detail.

Schutz gives very few clues about the length of time a group would require to negotiate the three major phases/stages. He says (p. 180) that compatability of participants in the Control phase is a problem for a group having three meetings, and he cites a study based on admittedly scant evidence indicating that affection problems become predominant in from 10 to 14 sessions. The implication is that only relatively long-term groups are likely to pass through all three of the phases or stages illustrated above. (It does seem worth pointing out that a similar period of 10-15 two-hour sessions is commonly assumed to be the minimum time period for a self-analytic training group to become relatively "open" and effective as a collaborative group.)

Schutz's developmental time frame, above, serves to inspire a few serious questions. What about groups that have 50 or 60 sessions? Is Schutz implying, for example, that the "middle stages" or "phase" -- when control problems are predominant -- last perhaps twice as long as they would in a 30-session group? Or, is it a misinterpretation to infer from Schutz's description that the entire pre-death-phase life

of all groups falls into three time periods, or phases?

Schutz's concept of three major phases of development ("initial," "middle," and "latter") does not appear to be consistent with his original dictum, ICAICA...ACI, which implies that ICA phases will continue to occur until the termination sequence begins. This raises a question: In what way in long-term groups does the problem-resolving dynamics continue between the end of the third major phase and the onset of the separation sequence? Why would inclusion problems become serious enough to become phase-predominant a second time after 15 or more sessions unless the leadership (power patterns), the membership, or the purpose of the group had changed radically? Schutz offers no additional information about the existence of developmental patterns in long-term groups.

I believe a case can be made for the continuing, episodic recurrence of ICA problem-resolving dynamics in long-term, intact groups. For example, it seems logical that residual, unresolved ICA problems would continue to exist in some group members. This, plus the probability of emerging problems originating from regression by some members in the ICA problem areas, would make it necessary for some kind of problem-resolving dynamic to operate throughout the entire life of any group. However, it is difficult to envision I, C, and A-predominant problem phases continuing to recur ad infinitum in fixed order in a long-term group. For example, after 50 or 60 sessions, any inclusion problems that emerged would seem

to be of a different order than those inclusion problems which emerged during the initial formation of the group. If trust had developed, members would no longer feel the strong drive to establish their identities in the group. Of course, if the purpose and task of the group changed radically then some persons would still have inclusion problems such as, "Do I want to be in or out in the light of the present odious task of the group? In short, I believe the theory could be refined somewhat in this respect by identifying the conditions under which the three recurring problem areas in intact groups are experienced at a different level of meaning and intensity, and perhaps are expressed in ways that differ from those manifested in the early life of the group. Identifying these possible qualitative differences would create a measurement problems, but it might reveal that the "same basic problems" do not exist throughout the life of all groups. The hard core existentialist would probably insist on a phase progression such as $I_1C_1A_1I_2C_2A_2I_3C_3A_3....$

In Schutz's theory the major factor that impels the process of group development is the members' tendencies (needs) to establish their already-established personal orientations toward Inclusion, Control and Affection. Thus, the process of group development is described as essentially a self-centered process of group members struggling to establish optimal compatibility in the three personal need areas within the limits imposed by their long-established personal preferences. Schutz considered

two kinds of compatibility* as important in producing effective, harmonious relationships among members:

(1) Interchange compatibility -- similarity of participants' active/passive styles in interchanging ideas and feelings related to power and intimacy, and

(2) Originator Compatibility -- similarity based on complementarity of those who wish to originate (independents) and those who wish to receive (dependents).

Interchange Compatibility exists:

(a) in the Inclusion Phase when participants can agree on how involved they will become with each other in pursuing the task. Conflict comes between those who like to do things together and those who prefer to work alone;

(b) in the Control Phase when participants can agree on the kind of authority structure they will use. Conflict comes between those who wish to set and follow rules and those who do not;

(c) in the Affection Phase when participants can agree on the same degree of closeness. Incompatibility brings conflict between highly affectionate, expressive persons who like to talk about personal matters and those who prefer social distance and talking impersonally.

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*Schutz's idea of "reciprocal compatibility" is not described here. It has been described as the degree to which one's expressed behavior matches another person's needs (wanted behavior).

Originator Compatibility exists:

(a) during the Inclusion Phase when those who actively initiate activities work with persons who wish to be included in those activities;

(b) during the Control Phase when persons who wish to control the activities work with persons who wish to be controlled;

(c) in the Affection Phase when persons who wish to give affection work with those who wish to receive it.

Obviously, knowledge about the group members' characteristics in these areas would allow the leader to predict the kind and intensity of problems likely to be encountered in each phase of a group's development. Considering the individual group members' need compatibilities in these three areas as the major determinants of group process means, in effect, that our psychosocial pasts are the major influence on the patterns of group process that emerge in the groups we attend.

Comparing Schutz's model with Gibb's is interesting in at least two respects. First, although both writers posited the constant presence of their basic group problems (or concerns), Gibb did not conceptualize phases, or distinctive sub-periods related to problem resolving activities, as Schutz did. Gibb's developmental flow was essentially quasi-cyclical, with problem concerns becoming modal (salient) in a random order (although optimal resolution is said to occur in a fixed order). Schutz's problem phases are problem-

specific and emerge in a fixed order; nothing in his model is random.

Second, the two models express different views of when the group resolves its control problems. Here are the skeletal elements of the two models:

Gibb's Primary Modal Concerns	Schutz's Predominant-Problem Phases
- Acceptance	- Inclusion
- Data Flow	- Control
- Goal Formation	- Affection
- Control	

Schutz's model obeys Bennis and Shepard's 1956 dictum (2:415-37) that groups resolve authority problems prior to resolving intimacy problems. Thus in Schutz's model, control problems are predominant in the "middle phase" of development and affection problems in the third phase. While Gibb sees the optimal resolution of the control problems as the final activity in achieving group maturity, we must remember that his model has no phase devoted to a given problem; each problem is resolved incrementally throughout the entire process. Although Gibb gives no clues to the amount of time spent on control problems, we know that the group works intermittently on control problems during the whole course of development. The same holds true for Schutz's groups, even though his model has an entire phase in which control problems are predominant.

The discrepancy between the priorities assigned by the

two writers to the resolution of control problems is due, I believe, to the different ways the two authors conceptualized (a) the operational aspects (behavioral evidence) of intimacy and (b) the need for intimacy. Gibb considered the member's needs for intimacy and trust as the key variable from the start; thus it seems probable that he inferred its dominating presence in much of the behavior he observed from the very beginning of a group. Schutz appears to have accepted as evidence of affection problems only explicit references to those problems, and these tended to appear more abundantly after the leadership struggle had been resolved in the control phase. By conceptualizing affection problems as predominant in the final stages of the group's development Schutz implied that members had resolved most of their control problems in the absence of fully integrated positive feelings. Gibb's hierarchy of concerns implies the opposite: that control problems cannot be optimally resolved until after integration of interpersonal feelings has taken place.

Gibb's "data flow" and "goal formation" concerns do not have exact equivalents expressed as key group problems in Schutz's model. However, Schutz did explain his inclusion-predominant phase as being concerned in part with the members deciding whether they wished to be "in" or "out" of the group; thus the purpose of the group was considered important to each member from the start. This is not to say that Gibb's

goal formation concern is fully resolved by group members during Schutz's inclusion-predominant phase. Actually, "goal formation" (developing group goals that integrate individual goals) as a member concern is optimally resolved relatively late in Gibb's development process. This lateness is probably an artifact of Gibb's unstructured T-group training situations. I do not believe this same concern is generally encountered in "natural groups," except perhaps when they change their basic goals. As for the absence of the equivalent of Gibb's "data flow" in Schutz's model, Schutz seems to have assumed that open communication (including feedback) among group members is a function of the interpersonal compatibility of the group members in each of his three basic problem areas (phases). Gibb, on the other hand, assumed that open communication is essentially a function of the amount of trust that develops.

The models of both Gibb and Schutz share a common fuzzy area -- the mechanisms or dynamics of continuous development. In neither model are they specified with clarity:

(1) In Gibb's model, any one of the four "areas of concern" can appear to be salient (i.e., of "modal concern") to group members at a given time. But we cannot be certain that work on a given problem/concern is actually resolving the concern in that problem area, because (a) the group might be using that activity indirectly to resolve a

higher order concern, and (b) the extent to which the higher order concern is resolved is a factor which controls the amount of growth (or resolution) in the problem area that appears to be salient. For the practitioner, knowing which group concern is really being worked on may be of small importance, since lower order concerns can be resolved only to the extent that higher order concerns are resolved.

(2) In Schutz's model the continuous development mechanism that operates to resolve residual problems is also not clearly described or illustrated. The wheel changing analogy is helpful but remains analogical. Is it always a group process? Can an individual process also be posited?

The theories of Gibb and Schutz can be seen as significant for different reasons. Gibb's theory explains how trust development is the key to the ultimate resolution of the Control problem in "successful" groups. Schutz's theory explains why some groups never develop a sufficient climate of trust to allow the group to resolve its Control problem, i.e., because certain members are basically incompatible and are unable to change their orientations to control that were established in childhood. Gibb would place the major blame on the presence of mistrust (which prevents open communication and feedback and integrated group goals -- all

of which he says are necessary for the optimal resolution of control problems). But in a sense the two authors are not very far apart; both emphasize the central role of members' personalities. Gibb, for example, asserts that "self-acceptance" is a major determinant of one's ability to give and receive acceptance and thus to develop trust.

Hare (11:282) suggests that Schutz's control and affection phases are essentially the same as Bennis and Shepard's two major stages (referred to as (a) authority/dependence and (b) intimacy/interdependence in their 1956 model). A brief comparison of these two models does seem appropriate, especially since Schutz (p. 168) did acknowledge Bennis's considerable influence. The two models are juxtaposed here in skeletonized form in order to highlight Hare's comparative configuration:

Schutz Model	Bennis and Shepard Model
(1) Inclusion (early phase)	(no equivalent)
(2) Control (middle phase)	substage 1: dependence-flight substage 2: counter-dep.-flight substage 3: resolution-catharsis
(3) Affection (later phase)	substage 4: enchantment-flight substage 5: disenchantment-flight substage 6: consensual validation

Hare says that Bennis and Shepard's model did not emphasize inclusion problems "in part because the determination of who is to be included or excluded from the group has already taken place by the time the training begins" (11:282). This view

assumes that Bennis and Shepard's group members did not experience inclusion problems because the groups were graduate classes and the group members had no uncertainty about whether they were "in" or "out" of the group. This interpretation is based on an imcomplete view of Schutz's Inclusion-predominant phase. The fact is, not all inclusion problems and behavioral manifestations are related to members' decision of whether to remain in the group or to get out. Even the firm knowledge that they were assigned to the group would not allay each members' need to establish his individual identity and to seek proof from other members that he is psychologically included. Both of these concerns are also present in the inclusion phase, according to Schutz. The group members would still need to "size up" each other through the discussion of so-called "goblet issues." (According to Schutz, all beginning relationships exhibit inclusion behaviors.) Thus, some inclusion needs and behaviors (in the Schutzian sense) must have operated in the early sessions of Bennis and Shepard's groups, but apparently those writers interpreted these behaviors as manifestations of "dependence-flight," which would be logical in terms of their conceptual framework. After all, the self-centered, non-group-responsible behaviors associated with Schutz's inclusion problems might also be interpreted as manifestations of dependence. In short, Schutz seems to have reported the modal responses of individuals to their own need

for acceptance, while Bennis and Shepard appear to have interpreted similar behaviors in terms of their different conceptual framework -- i.e., as reactions to the perceived need for centralized authority.

Comparing Bennis and Shepard's six sub-phases -- as described in Bennis' 1964 version (6:266-268) -- with Schutz's equivalent problem-predominant phases, I get this kind of match-up"

Bennis and Shepard Model		Schutz Model
subphase 1:	dependence-flight----------	Inclusion
subphase 2:	counter-dependence-flight----	Control
subphase 3:	resolution-catharsis	
subphase 4:	enchantment-flight----------	(no problems predominant)
subphase 5:	disenchantment-flight--------	Affection/Control
subphase 6:	consensual validation--------	(no problems predominant)

Interpreted as above, the Bennis/Shepard model tends to be generally congruent with Schutz's three-phase concept of development. Two relatively brief subphases in the Bennis/Shepard model appear to be problem-free in terms of Schutz's dominant-problem phase concept, since each phase features wholly positive feelings -- feelings of celebration in sub-phase four and feelings of individual acceptance and interdependence in subphase six. If we exclude these two very brief sub-periods, the only major difference between the two models appears to be in Bennis/Shepard's subphase five, where the authors' descriptions seem to indicate equal dominance of control and affection problems. Probably a case could be made

for considering affection problems to be predominant in Bennis and Shepard's subphase five.

A comparison of the textual descriptions of the two models reveals that some of the behaviors Schutz (pp. 173-4) cites as characteristic of his group termination sequence are also described by Bennis and Shepard as occurring near the end in their subphase five, e.g., increased absence and tardiness, a decrease of general involvement, and open disparagement of the group. Although Bennis and Shepard did not posit a termination sequence, it seems fairly clear that such a sequence was inherent in their group situations.

In summary, some areas of uncertainty seem to exist in Schutz's theoretical model:

(a) It is not absolutely clear in what respect a "problem area" is <u>always</u> salient during group operation (even after the group has sufficiently resolved a process problem to enable it to return to "the task at hand").

(b) It is not clear whether the term <u>phase</u> refers both to (a) the brief, intermittent periods of time during which, for example, inclusion and affection problems become salient during the control-predominant phase and to (b) the period of time characterized by the predominance of one problem area. Terms such as "phase" and "sub-phase" could have delineated the two kinds of time periods.

(c) It is not clear whether the developmental life of

> all groups (prior to termination) can be divided into three time periods which correspond to periods of I, C, and A-problem predominance regardless of the number of sessions.

Although Schutz's model is perhaps the classic example of models featuring cyclically recurring phases and continuous developmental flow, it does exhibit certain aspects of linearity. Each of the three major phases is different from the other two in one respect: only in the first phase are inclusion problems predominant, only in the second are control problems predominant, and only in the third are affection problems predominant. Thus the priority of the type of problem-resolving activities is different in each phase. In this sense each phase is uniquely different. Since we must assume (in the absence of contrary evidence) that groups must complete the first phase before moving to the second, and the second before moving to the third, the developmental flow can be said to exhibit, theoretically, a form of linear discontinuity, which is a hall-mark of linear models. However, although the major phases differ in at least one respect, and do occur sequentially, the problems of each phase are not unique to that phase and are not completely resolved and set aside once and for all before movement to the next phase. In short, only the problem-emphases (not the problems) are said to be different in each phase; the general nature of the three problems remains the same and members continue to work on all three problems throughout the entire developmental

process. Thus developmental flow is essentially continuous in Schutz's model.

Lest we assume that Schutz's basic personality compatibility theory was a brand new idea in group development when he published in the late 1950's, it should be mentioned that the germ of the idea had appeared many years before in the early writings on group dynamics. For example, Schutz's basic idea was clearly foreshadowed in the following passages by Coyle (27:214) in 1930:

> For each individual, a group integration . . . is only possible within the limits prescribed by his established pattern of personality . . .. The personalities contain relatively stable aspects. As a result the integration of individuals in a group is possible only to the extent that the limits of flexibility of adjustment coincide.

The existence of possible historical roots, however, does not diminish the significance of Schutz's theory. It is still one of the most completely articulated theories of group development and probably has inspired more published hard-data research than any other theory of small-group development.

Mills' Model*

In 1964 Theordore Mills published his five-phase model of group development. His model is another of those that seem to have been somewhat neglected by reviewers in the literature, even though it is supported by a great deal of "hard data." One possible reason for its neglect by some writers is that

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*All references to Mills by page numbers only will refer to his book, Group Transformation: An Analysis of a Learning Group (1964).

it features a so-called task orientation. That is, in addition to group self-analysis, the members of the learning group (students) had assigned readings of case histories and a discussion content task -- a feature that some "growth group" training purists probably consider to be a task orientation not consonant with "true" group development.

Mills' group members were college students in the Social Relations 120 course at Harvard. Designed to develop skills in observing and interpreting human behavior, the course met for 68 one-hour sessions, three times a week, over a period of eight months. The role of the instructor was passive, forcing the group members to assume leadership roles and to develop goals and indigenous norms to guide their collaborative learning process.

Mills' model is not the product of an attempt to create a comprehensive theory; he wished only to highlight the significance of three process factors he felt had not been sufficiently emphasized in group development theory (pp. 67-69): (1) the forming of indigenous group norms (the process of giving up preconceived normative notions and fashioning group-specific norms through experimentation), (2) the idea that the impending death of the group affects its development, and (3) the idea that groups always fall short of achieving an ideal state of being.

Mills' life-cycle model has five distinctive phases: (1) the encounter, (2) testing boundaries and modeling roles,

(3) negotiating an indigenous normative system, (4) production, and (5) separation. For most phases he listed the central issues (as he saw them), the member-perceived issues, the predominant activities, and the group properties resulting from the activities. Below, selected and adapted sentences from Mills' text (pp. 70-80) are presented in order to describe the essence of the model.

Phase 1: The Encounter (10 sessions)

Member-perceived issues

(1) Do I want to be a member in the light of possible demands and results?
(2) Am I capable of being a member?

Activities

(1) Naive activism: based on their preconceptions of discussion and their roles in other groups, members rush into the task.
(2) Disillusionment: these feelings occur because members find that preconceived normative behaviors do not work as in other groups.
(3) Retrenchment: members suppress their personal thoughts and avoid complicated areas of the task.

Emergent Properties

(1) A state of anomie develops because members' preconceived ideas about roles of group members and leaders are found to be inadequate.
(2) Several members make a long-term investment and commit themselves to the state of anomie.

Phase 2: Testing Boundaries and Modeling Roles (15 sessions)

Central Issues

(1) What is the scope of anomie? (How extensive is the uncertainty and how deep is the involvement?)
(2) What is involved in creating a more satisfying arrangement?

Member-preceived Issues

(1) Can I try new roles and ideas and risk failure?
(2) Can I go ahead without authoritative approval?

Activities

Members retest the limits of their preconceived roles and norms (boundary testing) and begin to model new roles by working on four kinds of critical group issues:

(a) Commitment: members try to assess the strength of their own and others' commitment to the group and its task.
(b) Authority: members test the instructor's assertion that he will not legislate for them or provide a structured format; attempts are made to manipulate him into a directive/nurturant role. Roles modeled include the rebellious, the recalcitrant, the usurper, the silent supporter, the independent student.
(c) Intimacy: tests are made (1) of the limits of self-revelation, (2) of the lasting power of one's initial likes and dislikes, and (3) of the solidarity of subgroups that offer security. Roles modeled may include the cold and detached, the intimate, the open and personal, and the colleague.
(d) Work: the issue of what the group wants to do is critical; so discussions of external matters such as the assigned cases and national and community events become "screen discussions" within which the group explores its future tasks. Issues of commitment and authority are explored in this substitute context.

Emergent Properties

- A notion of what it takes to be productive.
- Feelings of satisfaction in having begun to learn.
- A vague sense of goal-direction.

In summary, motivation and a rudimentary set of values have emerged. Certain preconceptions have been discarded and a range of possibilities has been explored.

Phase 3: Negotiating an Indigenous Normative System (15 sessions)

Central Issue

- How can members' preferences be formulated into an enabling set of norms that will facilitate the tasks peculiar to this group?

Member-perceived Issues

- Can I perform the student role and still be the kind of person I want to be? Is the preferred role compatible with my needs and capacities?

Activities

The group negotiates a set of indigenous norms and selects agents who sanction and control in terms of the norms. Norms develop as discussion focuses on negotiations related to these four issues:

(a) Commitment:
Membership criteria are discussed -- the rights of members to speak, remain silent, and be absent without paying a price are challenged. Loyalty tests are administered.

(b) Authority:
The group revolts against the instructor, setting up ideas of what members can and should do independently of the instructor. The taboo against expressing negative reactions against the instructor is relaxed.

(c) Intimacy:
Being close for its own sake is differentiated from being close to produce something of value. The latter becomes the basis of the new normative relationship in the area of intimacy. Differences among members become admitted and tolerable, provided the person contributes. Persons who remain alien are ostracized.

(d) Work:
Having discovered that some members are insightful, the group follows their lead on two levels -- (a) in interpreting what is going on in the group and (b) in learning about the assigned cases. All data become relevant.

Emergent Properties

- A nucleus of persons committed to a rudimentary normative system.
- A set of group conditions which members must fulfill before they take group time.
- A new role relationship between member and instructor; members are obligated to conduct inquiry and make decisions; the instructor is now obliged to back up those who control on behalf of the new norms.
- A new role relationship between members, who are now obliged to express feelings essential to an understanding of (a) the cases and (b) the group process, but are free to withhold personal likes that are peripheral to the task.
- A concept of the group as a unique system.

Phase 4: Production (15-20 sessions)

During this phase the group is concerned with their actual learning tasks, i.e., exploring the case histories and their own group process.

Central Issue

- Can the group produce something of lasting value?

Member-perceived Issues

- Can I communicate ideas that are relevant and testable?
- Can I understand, evaluate, and test others' ideas?

Activities

- Members apply what they know about observation, emotional expression, interpretation, formulation, and testing.
  (a) observation: to what extent are observations accurate? What cues does one tend to miss?
  (b) emotional expressions: to what extent are the feelings experienced by members or by persons in the case histories conveyed accurately?
  (c) interpretation: on how many levels might one interpret an event? What does a statement say about the speaker? The case? The group?
  (d) formulation: how does one translate what is learned into ideas that can be conveyed and tested for relevance and value?
  (e) testing: observations and interpretations are impersonally tested for accuracy and usefulness.

Members also engage in diagnosis to assess what it is in the group process that either disrupts or facilitates the working process and the individual learning process.

Emergent Properties

Testing for production or goal-achievement for a period of time causes revision of some components:

- The nature of the task is redefined; it was more difficult than it seemed.
- The aspiration level is lowered; the revised goal is to understand something about limited aspects of human and group processes.
- Norms governing what should or should not be expressed are relaxed.
- The group as a whole becomes the object of negative feelings; members are disillusioned with its resources and potential.

Phase 5: Separation (10-13 sessions)

Central Issues

- Can the group create something of lasting value?
- How can the group boundaries be dissolved before the last meeting?

Member-perceived Issues

- How can I recollect within the allotted time my attachments to others and to the group?
- Can I carry away the "group's valuables?"

Activities

Work: Efforts are spent generating new interpretations and formulations which might hold the key; the group history is reviewed.

Intimacy: Members withdraw first by expressing their deepest feelings about each others; positive feelings come out last (if there are negative feelings). The group boundary is dissolved for some members by bringing friends as visitors.

Authority: The instructor is asked to state once and for all that his role was artificial, not real; that the experience was really an experiment.

Commitment: Members review their roles and what they have given and received from each other. Positive feelings prevail at the end.

Emergent Properties

- Individual fantasies of a future reunion.
- Within persons, a tendency, on occasion, to model their intellectual and emotional processes after the pattern of processes that occurred in the group.
- A sense of accomplishment, and a tendency in some members to create groups in which they can reconstruct the instructor's role.

Mills' model has been praised for having sense of action-reaction in its cyclical interpretation of developmental sequences -- clearly a reference to the recurring elements in the model (3:66-67). Two things are recurrent in Mills'

model: (1) a pattern of events used to process group issues and (2) a set of group issues. One recurring element is the cause-and-effect pattern of events -- (1) the emergence of issues that lead to (2) activities to resolve group-issues that produce (3) new group properties, which cause new issues to emerge again. Mills observed the operation of this procedural pattern in each of the five phases, although all four issues shown below in step 2 were not dealt with in all five phases:



members' issues emerge as these kinds of group process issues in the group's discussion:

- authority
- intimacy
- commitment
- work

Step #1: Issues originate in the minds of individual members as individually-pondered but unarticulated questions and feelings concerning perceived difficulties, deficiencies, or threats involving the self and/or the group process. The individual issues get translated into "group issues" (step 2) when several members voice similar concerns and/or come into conflict over existing or suggested group functional or structural matters.

Step #2: When a "group issue" arises, it affects the whole group, whether it be (a) an issue recognized and openly articulated or (b) expressed only indirectly through behaviors and seemingly unrelated conflicts. We are told (p. 73) that several issues are worked on indirectly, e.g., authority issues and commitment issues are worked on through discussion of "work" issues. There are four types of group issues: those relating to commitment, to intimacy, to authority, and to work. The "activities" in this step of the cycle are simply the actions taken by members to resolve the group issues sufficiently to allow the group to move on.

Step #3: After a given group issue has been resolved sufficiently to allow the group to move on, there have been created new understandings, new relationships, and often new norms which change the structural aspects of the group. These changes are the products of the issue-resolving process and are called new "group properties."

Back to Step #1: New group properties (norms, relationships, and common understandings) generate new issues in the minds of individual members, and the cycle begins again.

Mills does not describe in detail the dynamics of the procedural cycle; the illustration and explication, above, are inferred from his bare-bones outline and are thus conjectural. We are not told (a) how many times a group is likely to cycle through the steps in a given phase, or (b) what typical behaviors are associated with the issue-resolving activities

in the cycle. The economy of Mills' descriptions suppressed the kind of data that would be needed to get a detailed view of the dynamics of this recurring process.

A second recurring element in Mills' model is a set of group issues. However, it would be more accurate to say that the same four kinds of group issues recur. (The "same" issues can be said to recur only in a nominal sense. Since the issues recur in different situational contexts in the different phases, the substantive parts of the four issues are different in the different developmental phases.)

The four "group issues" are a major ingredient of Mills' development model. What are these four basic "group issues?" Three of the four (commitment, authority, intimacy*) translate as the same "group problems" concept used by Gibb, Bradford, and Schutz in the sense that they are group process obstacles the members must resolve in order to become a fully effective group. To these three issues Mills added "work" issues -- a problem area the other three writers did not use. Presumably Mills was incorporating Bion's theory of two levels of group process -- the rational and the emotional. For Mills this concept translated into (1) work issues (rational level) and (2) issues of commitment, authority, and intimacy (emo-

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*Mills' commitment, authority, and intimacy issues are remarkably parallel to Schutz's inclusion, control, and affection problems, respectively, a fact already noted by Hare (11:289-90). As a matter of fact, Mills even lists them in the same order as Schutz, although he did not assert directly as Schutz did that the problems would emerge in that fixed order.

tional level). The adding of "work issues" to the three traditional group issues enabled Mills to explain that groups do not always resolve group issues through open discussion of the issues; instead, they frequently approach sensitive, emotional group issues indirectly through the discussion of task oriented work issues (p. 73). Apparently only the work issues (and perhaps at some points the intimacy issue) were openly discussed as explicit issues in Phase 2. It is perhaps natural for groups such as Mills', with explicit external tasks (tasks involving discussion of matters other than the internal group dynamics), to resolve commitment and authority problems through the discussion of work issues. This phenomenon is relatively common in "natural" work groups.

In two of his five phases Mills departed from the concept that all group problems are present at all times -- a concept that the other three cyclical theorists appear to accept. In both Phase 4 and Phase 1 the group was described as being concerned with only one group issue. Let us examine Phase 4 first.

Only work issues and activities are described in Phase 4; commitment, authority, and intimacy are not even mentioned. Why would Mills do this? Is he implying (a) that the problems of intimacy, authority and commitment did remain in some residual form but did not manifest themselves enough to be mentioned? Or (b) is he implying that problems in those three areas had been sufficiently or completely resolved

during Phase 2 and Phase 3? If the latter is inferred, which seems most likely, then Mills' model may be said to exhibit discontinuous developmental flow, a major characteristic of linear-type models. One ambiguous clue to Mills' intent appears in his introductory summary of Phase 4 (p. 76): ". . .its (the group's) new issue is what it can produce." (Underlining mine). Is Mills implying that the group retains its "old" issues and simply adds the "new" work issue? Or does he mean that the three "old" issues were resolved at the end of Phase 3 and that now the group can focus on its "new" (and only) issue -- the work issue? Since Mills described no issue-resolving activities other than work issues in Phase 4 it seems reasonable to infer that no other problems existed in Phase 4. Although an apologist might point out that Mills clearly stated he did not propose to account for all group variables in this model, on the variables he chose not to trace in the life of the group he did not present any data. We know he did gather data on commitment, authority, intimacy, and work in several different phases; thus we must assume that he sought data to support the existence of activities related to intimacy, authority, and commitment in Phase 4, but found no supporting data.

The implication of Phase 4 being a single-problem phase is ironic indeed, for Mills inveighed heartily against the idea that groups reach a developmentally mature phase -- a relatively problem-free state of affairs. In fact, one major

reason he gave for presenting his model (p. 68) was to emphasize the idea of "partial consummation," and to illustrate that groups do not "climb to an ideal peak." Thus the fact that his Phase 4 seems to illustrate a high water mark of task-oriented group maturity does not seem characteristic of Mills. The existence of a relatively problem-free work phase is a characteristic associated with linear-type rather than cyclical models of group development.

Mills' Phase 1 is the only one of his five phases in which none of the four major group issues (problem areas) is specifically described as present, although "commitment" is implied to be a major issue (Mills used the idea of commitment (p. 71) to describe an "emergent property" of Phase 1). A major unanswered question is, why didn't Mills' data reveal the presence of group problems of authority, intimacy, and work -- at least to some extent? The models of Gibb, Schutz, and Bradford all lead us to expect that all group problems are present at least in rudimentary form. Should we infer that the problems were present even though Mills did not mention them? For example, we know from Mills' description of Phase 1 that group members initially rushed into the task, and then became disillusioned and drew back from the experience because their preconceived expectations about group roles -- especially leadership roles -- were not met. Obviously, the members floundered aimlessly in the absence of centralized leadership (an emergent property of Phase 1 was said to be "anomie"). Following this reasoning would allow us to infer

that the authority problem must have been manifested at least indirectly. So one wonders shy Mills didn't describe the authority issue as present in Phase 1.

Both Schutz and Mills featured sequential phases, i.e., distinctive sub-periods in the list of the group. The outlines of their models, below, omit the termination phases of both models, since these phases are compared later in this essay:



The first phase in both models features mainly inclusion/commitment problems; Schutz's model further stipulates the presence of control problems and affection problems, although they are subordinant. For Mills it is a single-problem phase.

Mills seems to have differentiated Schutz's Phase 2 (Control-predominant phase) into two distinctive phases. The members' uncertainty is said to cause individual testing of limits and new roles in Phase 2; Phase 3 reflects the shift from (a) individual-centered control-testing behavior to (b) collaborative efforts to control the shared predicament through developing explicit group norms. These two phases reflect Mills' agreement with Schutz (and the other cyclical theorists) that all group process issues/problems are present and dealt with throughout the life of the group. A major difference is that Schutz maintains that Control problems are predominant during this period; Mills does not specify any of his four problem areas as predominant. However, the descriptive titles of his Phase 2 and Phase 3 (especially the words "testing" and "negotiating") do suggest that the authority issue could be considered predominant, as in Schutz's Phase 2.

Schutz does not have a phase analogous to Mills' production phase. Mills' work phase (Phase 4) is analogous to Xennis and Shepard's final "consensual validation" sub-stage -- that period when the group becomes relatively free of group process problems and most capable of high level work.

The models of most linear theorists do have such a phase. For example, Mills' "production" phase has been compared to Stage 4 in Tuckman's linear model (11:289-90), which is also pictured as the group's period of mature "performing" (23: 394-395).

Schutz's affection-predominant third phase also has no equivalent phase in Mills' model. In Mills' Phase 2, and particularly in Phases 3 and 4, the members establish intimacy norms which allow them to express their feelings about each other only to the extent necessary to pursue their work tasks productively in Phase 4. The dynamics involved in setting this norm are not described, but the group is said to reject the idea of "being close" for the sake of "being close." Significantly, Mills' group members work out their intimacy and internal authority problems concurrently in Phases 2 and 3, in direct contrast to Schutz's model, in which group members resolve major authority problems prior to resolving their major intimacy problems.

In Mills' model, the group members appear to resolve the largest portion of both their authority and their intimacy problems in Phase 3 rather than in Phase 2.. The order of events in Phase 3 are not clearly specified; thus the group revolt might have occurred before the group finalized its intimacy norms. If these events did occur in this order it would tend to support Bennis and Shepard's concept (i.e., authority problems are resolved before intimacy problems.)

Mills' group members determine and agree on the group's actual work tasks at the end of Phase 3 (p. 76). It is at this point that (to use Gibb's terms) the group achieves "goal formation" -- arrives at integrated "group goals." In Gibbs' theory, the optimal integration of group goals must take place prior to the optimal development of the control norms. However, Mills lists the activities in his Phase 3 in this order: commitment, authority, intimacy, work. Thus the norms related to control issues appear to have been developed before the work issues including group goals were finally dealt with. However, the issues might have recurred at various times under various guises. Mills did not specify a fixed order of emergence.

Since the models of both Mills and Schutz were life-stage models, each writer described a group termination sequence. One reviewer (12:89-90) has indicated that Mills' entire separation phase is analogous to only the "inclusion" element in Schutz's three-element termination sequence. The facts, however, seem to suggest a closer relationships between the two models. The two termination sequences are outlined as follows:

Sub-phases in Schutz's Termination Sequence	Sub-phases in Mills' Termination Phase
(?)	Work
Affection	Intimacy
Control	Authority
Inclusion	Commitment

If we accept the order in which Mills lists his termination activities as the order in which they occurred (a reasonable assumption), then Mills' separation sequence seems to be similar to that of Schutz. (This is particularly true if we disregard Mills' "work" issues -- a group issue Schutz did not include in his model). Below we deal with only the termination activities associated with the last three of Mills' four group issues, i.e., those which are relatively analogous to those of Schutz's three group problem areas. They are compared one at a time in the order in which they are said to occur in both models. The sources are (18:174) and (13:74):

Schutz's Affection - Withdrawal Activities	Mills' Intimacy - Withdrawal Activities
The personal positive and negative feelings are dealt with first, often by recalling incidents that had not been completely resolved or understood. The gradual withdrawal of emotional investment is also often characterized by increased absence and tardiness and low participation. Some people demean the group as if to say, "See, I won't miss you."	Members begin their withdrawal in this area by expressing their deepest positive and negative feelings about each other. Negative feelings are expressed first. The group boundary is dissolved also by bringing friends as visitors and by telling others what has taken place in the group.

Being a personality theorist, Schutz pointed out that withdrawal behaviors associated with affection are likely to take different forms in response to the different personality needs of the individuals; thus he listed several typical behaviors. Both writers listed first the personal expression of positive and negative feelings about each other, and both also said the negative feelings were expressed first.

Schutz's Control - Withdrawal Activities	Mills' Authority - Withdrawal Activities
Discussion focuses on the leader and on the reasons for the members' compliance or rebellion to his wishes.	The attempt to resolve the boundary between the instructor as authority and other authorities takes the form of asking him to state once and for all that his role was artificial and that the course was an experiment.

Both authors indicated that the focus was on the leader (authority). Schutz's group members sought reasons why they complied and/or rebelled, while Mills' group members sought reasons for their leader's behavior.

Schutz's Inclusion - Withdrawal Activities	Mills' Commitment - Withdrawal Activities
Discussions occur about the possibility of continuing the group and about how committed each member really was.	Members review their roles in the group and what they as individuals have given and received; positive feelings are aroused.

Both authors reported positive feelings, and both also reported discussions of commitment, i.e., Mills' members' review of what they gave to the group was essentially the same as Schutz's members talking about how committed each person was.

In summary, Mills' debt to Schutz appears to be considerable, not only in his pre-separation phases, but also in his separation phase. For example, aside from the "work issue," (1) Mills lists the order of his issue-resolving activities in both Phases 2 and 3 in the same order in which Schutz's analogous group problems emerge into predominance: commitment, authority, intimacy, (and work). (2) Like Schutz, in his separation phase Mills lists the order of issue-disengagement activities in the exact reverse order of their prior emergence: (work), intimacy, authority, and commitment.

IV. SUMMARY: INFERENCES AND IMPLICATIONS

In this section the writer summarizes the inferences and implications he considers important. No attempt is made to summarize all comparative aspects of the four models. The material is presented in sections in order to provide a separate focus for each of these areas: group problem concepts, phase theory, and developmental flow, cyclical theory, and the motive forces of group development. Since these concepts are highly related, it was impossible to avoid some repetition.

Concepts Related to Group Process Problems

(1) Small groups have a relatively common set of group process problems.

Although they disagreed on the number and exact nature of group problems, Bradford, Gibb, and Schutz all used the term "problems" or "problem areas" at some point in their writings to signify areas of interpersonal difficulty that groups try to resolve in the process of development. Mills preferred the term "issues." Other synonyms used by the writers included modal concerns, group needs, group need areas, group issues and basic group problems. When these authors say that groups have, for example, three basic problems or issues, they mean three types of problems or issues, each problem type or "problem area" consisting of a set of related problems.

Bradford listed six group problems; both Gibb and Mills, four; and Schutz, three. However, some of the differences

between them are perhaps more apparent than real. For example, three of Bradford's six group problems could be interpreted as differentiated aspects of a single problem area which both Gibb and Schutz called Control problems. This is apparent in the listing of the group problems, below. Gibb's problems are listed in the hierarchical order in which optimal resolution is said to occur; Schutz's problems are listed in the order in which the problems become predominant. Mills' issues are listed in the order in which they emerge through activities in his Phases 2 and 3:



The unbroken lines indicate "probable" congruencies and the dotted lines, "possible" or "partial" congruencies.

Schutz's inclusion problems probably are analogous to Bradford's and Gibb's communication and data-flow problems, respectively -- at least to the degree that group goal formation (the integrating of individual goals) is synonymous with

the process of members' committing themselves to the group task (commitment to group task is an inclusion issue in Schutz).

The four theorists showed essential agreement in conceptualizing three broad problem domains: (1) affection/intimacy/acceptance, (2) control/authority, and (3) inclusion/commitment/goal formation. Mills alone utilized the work task dimension.

(2) Group problems recur.

Bradford, Gibb, and Schutz held that group problems are only temporarily -- never completely -- resolved. Mills apparently disagreed, since in his model three of the four group problems are optimally resolved before the group enters his productive work phase (Phase 4).

It is generally conceded that even long term groups with high cohesiveness continue to have periods of disharmoney and ineffective functioning. Linear theorists probably would claim that new, different problems have arisen, since prior problems of group development would be assumed to have been resolved in earlier phases. Cyclical theorists would be more likely to say that the periods of disharmony are due to the recurrence of certain basic group problems. From the cyclical perspective at least two kinds of causes for recurring problems seem possible: (1) psychosocial rationales presented by cyclical theorists and (2) a behavior-classification rationale suggested by the present writer.

Bradford, Gibb, and Schutz emphasize psychosocial causes to account for the recurrence of group problems. Bradford maintained that every session was, to some extent, like a new and different group starting, with ever-changing tasks and shifting patterns of personal influence; thus he felt that ever-changing conditions continued to generate new manifestations of the basic problems of group life. His rationale recognized that members' experiences between sessions do affect their participation in the group sessions (reflecting his belief that groups were open systems).

Schutz's rationale for recurrent problems is also based, in part, on the assumption of ever-changing group conditions. Changing tasks and changing power patterns are, in his theory, threats to each member's relatively fixed personality orientations toward inclusion, control, and affection. Thus he saw each member as constantly engaged in trying to meet his individual needs in these three problem areas.

The present writer believes that recurrent group problems are, at least in part, artifacts of the system cyclical theorists use to classify behavior. Cyclical theorists apparently posit a relatively few types or categories of group problems. They are assumed to be inclusive enough to subsume all observed problem behaviors. Each major problem category or "type" of behavior is conceptualized as a continuum that includes an infinite number of subtypical behaviors, each of which is assumed to be a manifestation of that "type"

of behavior. All observed behaviors must be classified as manifestations of one of the relatively few "types" of behavior. Thus the fact that relatively few group problems are said to recur through a multitude of different member behaviors is a predictable effect of conceptualizing a few "types" of behavior on continua that are assumed to categorize all behaviors. This also helps explain why cyclical theorists emphasize that group problems recur in many different guises. A more complete discussion of this problem is included in the section entitled "Concepts Related to Phase Theory."

Some theorists probably would attribute the causes of periods of ineffective functioning in long term groups to "strains" that are said to emerge when a group pursues either adaptive or integrative tasks (in accordance with the Balesian hypothesis of adaptive-integrative changes in groups). However, since Mills (13:108) has shown that Bales' bypothesis erroneously assumes groups to be closed systems, it seems clear that Bales' theory is, at best, only a partial explanation for changes in group solidarity.

(3) Group problems recur in either (a) a fixed order or (b) a random order.

Bradford and Gibb both posit a random order of group problem recurrence; Schutz insists on a fixed order of recurrence, and Mills implies a fixed order of recurrent in two of his four pre-separation phases.

(4) Group problems are optimally resolved in either (a) a fixed order or (b) a random order.

Both Schutz and Gibb specify a fixed order in which group problems are optimally resolved. Bradford does not formally address this issue. Mills implies optimal resolution of three of his four group problems at the end of his Phase 3 in the same order in which they emerged in Phase 2. These three problems and their order of emergence are congruent with Schutz's problems and order of emergence.

(5) All basic group problems are constantly present.

Gibb, Schutz, and Bradford agree on the constant presence of all basic group problems, although for different reasons. Mills indicates the presence of all four of his group problems in only three of his five phases.

At first glance, the idea that all group problems are constantly present seems to contradict the idea that the problems recur (Why should problems have to recur if they are always present?). The basic rationale is that when a problem is said to recur, it has not been completely absent; it recurs into greater group salience -- becomes the "predominant" or "modal" problem of the moment -- the one most members are working on. The remaining problems -- those which recede into non-prominence -- apparently remain present in the group in some form that is not precisely explained. Schutz speaks of "residual problems," implying that some unresolved problems continue to exist, presumably in the minds of some individuals

members. Schutz's emphasis on three ever-present individual needs as the basis of group problems accounts for his support of the concept of the constant presence of group problems. For him, group problems in the three areas of ICA are reflections of personality needs of individuals who constantly have difficulties either establishing or maintaining their preferred personality orientations in the three areas of inclusion, control, and affection. The changing conditions in the group produce a constant need for members to maintain or reestablish their preferred status level (inclusion), amount of influence (control), and level of acceptance (affection).

Bradford supports the idea of the constant presence of his six basic problems by asserting that new problems are generated almost constantly within his basic group problem areas due to (a) the ever changing tasks of the group and (b) the shifting patterns of influence. However, Bradford was referring only to self-analytic groups, while Schutz was theorizing about all groups. Nevertheless, Schutz's assertion of constantly changing conditions in groups is in agreement with Bradford's rationale. Gibb did not give a supporintg rationale.

It is interesting to note that the concepts of the constant presence of all problems and continuous developmental flow probably were pioneered by Bales and Strodtbeck. In their three-phase problem solving model of 1951 they indicated

that the problem tasks of all three phases were in operation at any given time (Rosenfeld, p. 40). Apparently they also believed (as Schutz and Gibb were to claim later) that a phase change was really a shift in the degree of salience of one of the problem tasks. The idea that all problems were being worked on during all phases was essentially the concept of continuous developmental flow that also was emphasized later by Bradford, Schutz, and Gibb.

In what sense, one wonders, are all basic group problems continually present? (1) In the conscious minds of one or more members? (2) In the subconscious minds of one or more members? (3) Indirectly, through the effects of the unresolved problems on the group process? The constant presence of unresolved problems (in all group problem areas) in the conscious minds of the members implies that at least one (and probably several) members can not give their full conscious efforts to the group task, or to resolving the salient group problem of the moment. Schutz spoke of members for whom one problem area was prepotent and indicated that these persons tend to perceive all tasks in terms of their prepotent problem. He did not indicate whether this was a conscious or a subconscious process, and he did not hypothesize specifically that members without prepotent problems tend to harbor unresolved problems in their conscious minds. In 1973, Cohen and Smith (8:160) faced similar ambiguities in their evolutionary model of group development. They used concepts similar to those of Gibb and Schutz. In

fact, Cohen and Smith's theory might be best described, historically, as an elaboration and refinement of the cyclical theories of the 1960s. For example, Cohen and Smith also assume that all group issues are current at all times during the life of the group, and among these issues are the familiar authority, control, and intimacy. Basic issues (group problems) are said to recur into prominence, or become the focus of discussion, in the form of "dominant theme topics," which are analogous to Gibb's and Schutz's group salient problems-of-the-moment. However, Cohen and Smith recognized that when the basic issues -- "theme topics" -- are dealt with, they undergo change. Thus changes in the basic issues are reflected in different theme topic titles which describe the form-of-the-moment of the basic issues at ten different stages in the development process. The developmental life of the group is more accurately described by ten differentiated phase aspects of the basic issues than by, say, Schutz's relatively less differentiated three group problems -- ICAICA....

As we have seen, cyclic theorists like to assert that basic issues/problems appear in many different guises. Cohen and Smith simply gave names to ten of these guises and called them "theme topics." Thus at the nominal level their ten-stage model seems to be discontinuous, but at the substantive level of basic issues, developmental flow can be characterized as continuous, since the basic issues continue to recur and be

dealt with in the guise of ten theme topics during the entire life of the group.

But even in the Cohen/Smith model, a certain ambiguity surrounds at least one of the processes; it is the same ambiguity found in the four cyclic models in the present study. After the group works at resolving a basic group problem (a theme topic) and resolves it sufficiently, it returns to "a sub-threshold level of tension." What is this realm? In what sense is it assumed to be still current as a problem/issue? Did it drop into everyone's subconscious, or is it assumed to be still present because at least one person has continuing difficulty with it and still things about it consciously?

(6) Group problems are resolved through the group process.

All four writers appear to assume that group problem-resolving activities are accomplished only through members' active verbal participation in the group's process. Although no author mentioned the individual member as the sole agent of problem resolution, it seems reasonable to assume that some members do resolve some of their difficulties related to a group problem area through individual intellectual efforts that are unrelated to either explicit or "screen" discussion of a given group problem.

(7) Groups sometimes use indirect types of problem-resolving activities.

Two ways to resolve group problems are implied: (1) by working openly at them as explicit tasks, and (2) by working at them indirectly through the pursuit of other kinds of tasks.

Three of the four theorists reported the operation of a two-level process in which events occurring at the level of manifest content do not reflect the actual group problem-resolving task of the moment. Gibb, in referring to a group's tendency to work at one problem by appearing to work at another, called it "camoflaged" content. Bradford reported the process of working "indirectly" at resolving group problems. And Mills speaks of "screen discussions" in which certain group issues are dealt with in a "substitute context," the most common being authority issues worked out in the context of making decisions about work issues. Obviously these mechanisms can be used to give powerful support to the concept of "recurring group problems." If the problems do not recur as explicit manifest content, they can be said to recur in some other guise.

From the historical perspective it is worth noting that the idea of pursuing masked and multiple purposes in the group process did not originate with cyclical theorists. For example, as early as 1930 in one of the early books on social processes, Coyle noted the operation of "polytelism" (27:38) -- the use of one means to achieve multiple ends, a concept she had encountered in a book published in 1926 (28:37). In

addition, clinicians had already developed the tradition of seeking latent motives and meaning from the analysis of observed behavior and explicit content.

(8) The process of resolving group problems is constant in certain types of groups and periodic in others.

The models of both Gibb and Bradford imply that group problem-resolving activity is constant. Descriptions do not refer specifically to task activities other than those related to the resolving of basic group problems. Perhaps this is to be expected in models describing self-analytic T-Groups, which do not have external tasks.

The models of Schutz and Mills do not feature constant problem-resolving activities. Although Schutz's chapter on group development devotes almost all of its space to describing the order and dynamics of group problem resolution, one passage does indicate that after a problem has been sufficiently resolved, the members return to the task at hand, indicating that problem resolving activities are periodic and instrumental, not constant. Mills' model has a work phase in which problems of authority, intimacy, and inclusion were not described as present.

The models of both Mills and Schutz had to take account of situations in which the group had externally imposed tasks -- tasks other than self-analytic activities. (Schutz's model was designed to be universally applicable, and Mills' learning group had assigned content tasks.) It appears that problem resolving activities are conceptualized as a constant process

in self-analytic groups. Mills' model suggests that in long-term groups with external tasks, there are periods free from group problem-resolving processes. Schutz's model also implies that problem-resolving activities are episodic. However, Schutz admitted (18:vii) that his theory is weak at the point of explaining the relation of work/task behavior and interpersonal needs (ICA). If one assumes that all member participation aims at resolving interpersonal needs, as his theory strongly suggests, then individual problem-resolving activities are constant, even in groups with external tasks.

To this writer the concept of recurring group problems/issues remains somewhat elusive. I do not find a clear, detailed description of it in the writings of any of the four writers surveyed in this study. For example, in spite of the fact that recurring phenomena are central to all four models, not one of the theorists described criteria for identifying the isomorphic elements in the recurring events. Nor did any of them present solid examples from experience to illustrate the form and circumstances of recurrence.

Perhaps it is the present imprecision of the concept of recurring group problems that perpetuates a theoretical issue revealed in this remark by Gibbard, et al. (10:88), "How can there be progress in the face of recurring patterns and cycles?"

This question reflects the view of typical linear theorists, who believe that true developmental changes can not be said to take place in a given problem area so long as the problem continues to recur. For them, problem recurrence is evidence of non-development, and perhaps even a sign of regressive movement.

Does problem recurrence imply that the group must start over, completely anew, the process of resolving the problem? Or, is the problem-resolving process an incremental process of developing a series of quasi-solutions, over time, to the same problem? Or, does each "recurrence" of a given problem actually constitute a different problem, but one that is similar in type to a previous problem? The latter explanation would, of course, be more amenable to theorists who are oriented to the linear tradition.

Concepts Related to the Motive Force of Development

Although none of the four writers formally addressed the question, What is group development?, some of them did describe the major force they felt impels group development and the fundamental nature of the process and its causes.

For Schutz the process of members resolving recurring group problems in the group setting is the external aspect of development. He sees group problems as social manifestations of individual internal personality needs in the areas of inclusion, control, and affection. Each member has a personal preference in each of these areas (established since childhood) and a natural striving to establish the preferred conditions. These strivings result in "group problems" in the three areas. For Schutz group development is, in a sense, a drama of conflicting personality structures in which the main characters are the members' pre-established personality "sets," which do battle through various strategems to maintain their preferred conditions. Thus development is simply the social process of achieving and maintaining optimal member compatibility in the three personality areas. In the tradition of ego-psychology, groups are assumed to obey the same laws as individuals.

Mills' model reflects his allegiance to Schutz's formulation of the three personality needs that feed the problem-resolving process of group development, but he added a fourth

need, or problem area, that was said to affect development: the drive for "production," with its attendant work issues/ problems. His emphasis on production, or work, is consonant with the concept of "goal formation" emphasized by both Gibb and Bradford. In this respect, Schutz was the only one of the four who did not openly ascribe significance to the members' drive for production. He preferred to cling solely to personality needs of individuals. Organismic ends and properties are alien to his approach.

Gibb also saw members' production needs and control needs as important motivating forces, but he considered members' needs for authentic relationships and a state of trust as primary. His model is based on the assumption that healthy persons accept themselves and have a basic need to feel accepted by others. Thus he saw group members' need to establish authentic, sharing relationships and to reduce distrust as a fundamental motive for group development.

Some persons might believe the resolving of a group's actual process problems to be the major events in a group's development, but Bradford disagreed with this view. He saw development as the improving of the process by which the group's problems are resolved -- the collaborative process of gathering and analyzing data about the group's process. The motive force that fuels this process, Bradford felt, was members' increasing dissatisfaction with the group's present

practices, coupled with a growing understanding of the group's dynamics. It must be remembered that Bradford's model was designed to explain the dynamics of T-groups, which during that period were designed as experiences for learning about the nature of the dynamics of groups. Since "natural work groups" do not ordinarily feature systematic opportunities for members to learn how to diagnose problems in groups, this aspect of development is absent in the groups of the workaday world. Bradford's conceptualization was intended to apply only to certain kinds of learning groups, not to all groups.

Concepts Related to Phase Theory and Developmental Flow

The models of Bradford, Schutz and Mills include phases defined as subperiods characterized by distinctive phenomena. Gibb rejected the idea of identifiable phases. Although Bradford also rejected the idea of developmental phases, his model did have phases defined as distinctive subperiods.

Bradford's affective phases are alternating periods of member dissatisfaction/satisfaction that are said to recur predictably in that order during the development process in groups that develop successfully. The dissatisfaction phases, in particular, are integral to his theory, because the intensifying of member dissatisfaction is said to impel the group toward decisions to diagnose and resolve group problems. For Bradford this learning process is central to group development. The exact number of affective phases in Bradford's model is unclear. Bradford's text seems to indicate that only two phases of dissatisfaction and two of satisfaction occur during development; however, his intent is ambiguous (see the section on Bradford's model). Bradford did not designate these affective periods as phases, probably because they did not reflect developmental changes in the affective sphere.

The phase concepts in Schutz's and Mills' models are interesting from a comparative perspective because they help illustrate the contrasting theoretical positions of linear and cyclical theory. Although Schutz's phase progression has echoes of linearity (explained earlier in the section on Schutz), his model is essentially cyclical because it portrays the entire developmental life of the group as permeated by the same set of regularly recurring problems. The distinctiveness of each of his phases is determined only by the relative predominance of problem-resolving activities in one of his three problem areas; since problem resolving activities continue simultaneously in the other two problem areas, developmental flow is continuous.

Mills' model does not merely echo linearity; it demonstrates its major characteristic of discontinuous developmental flow. Only three of his five phases feature all four of his recurring group issues. In addition, the "production" phase (Phase 4) is devoid of all group issues except "work" issues, indicating that three of his four group issues are resolved prior to the advent of the production phase. Developmental flow is thus discontinuous, as in the classically linear models of Bennis and Shepard (2:415-37) and Tuckman (23:384-99).

Defining phases simply as distinctive subperiods in the life of a group leads one finally to the identifying of attributes of distinctiveness. Bradford considered his recurring cycle of problem-resolving activities as a four-phase sequence. Undeniably, each of the four events can be said to occupy a subperiod of time that is "distinctive" in the sense that it differs from contiguous subperiods with respect to the tasks that are pursued. In the context of this definition of phases several varieties of "recurring phases" probably could be identified in the literature*. However, Bradford's four recurring phases can also be considered as nothing more than a recurring procedural-task pattern of interaction -- as a recurring mechanism that promotes group development rather than as developmental phases of group development. That is, a distinction probably should be made between "instrumental phases" that occur during group development

*For example, in the present study if recurrence was the major characteristic used to describe the classification type, three sub-types of recurring phases could be identified: (1) Problem-Specific Phases: each phase is identifiable by the predominance of one kind of group problem; the order of problem emergence is emphasized (Schutz). (2) Process-Specific Phases: each phase is distinctive by virtue of a specific task which the group must perform in the process of resolving group problems; emphasis is on the nature and order of recurring group tasks involved in successfully resolving group problems (Bradford). (3) Phases of Affective Conditions: emphasis is on recurring modal affective conditions during "successful" development (Bradford).

and "developmental phases" of group development. A developmental phase should be defined in terms of developmental changes in group properties: as a subperiod that is distinctive by virtue of qualitative changes in group structure/interpersonal relations.

The names of Mills' first four phases, together with his textual descriptions of progressive changes in roles and in norms relating to commitment, authority, work, and intimacy, portray a concept of development as an ever-progressive journey through phases of qualitative changes in group structure and interpersonal relations. Schutz's model also seems to portray qualitative phases of development that progressively resolve problems of inclusion, control, and affection, up to the end of the Affection-predominant Phase. After this point, however, the same three types of problems are said to recur.

One critical issue in phase theory is closely related to certain concepts used by cyclical theorists. The issue is posed by Fisher's claim that developmental phases can be identified only because a particular type of behavior is predominant during a given subperiod, not because any behavior is unique to that phase (17:56). Fisher assumes, among other things, that all types of behavior are present during the entire life of the group. Bradford, Gibb, and

Schutz all subscribe to the parallel idea that all types of group problems are always present. To illustrate the point, even in Schutz's termination phase, the members' problems of disengagement are described under the same group problem-type rubrics that are used to describe the problems of group formation. (Schutz's model is used here deliberately because he used the concept of "predominant problem" behaviors to define his phases -- essentially the same as Fisher's idea that phases can be identified only by the predominance of a given type of behavior rather than by behaviors unique to that subperiod.)

Fisher's rejection of the idea of unique behavior reveals a basic assumption: that all behavior must be classified by "types" on continua (in the Darwinian tradition) rather than by discrete categories in the Aristotlian tradition. If behavior is classified by types, then each "type" of behavior is a continuum and the degrees of difference along the continuum are merely subtypes of the category and thus are not "essentially" different behaviors. They are said to differ in degree rather than "in kind." On the other hand, if behavior is considered dichotomous and is classified in discrete categories there are no subtypes; a behavior can be unique. If group members changed from a period of "mild satisfaction" to a period of "high satisfaction," linear

and cyclical theorists would be likely to interpret the situation in different ways. The cyclical theorist would describe the two periods as manifesting essentially the same type of behavior, because both of the qualitative degrees of difference in level of satisfaction would be classified as subtypes of "positive satisfaction." The differences in degree of satisfaction would be considered as relatively unimportant. The linear theorist would interpret the state of mild satifaction as distinctively different from the state of high satisfaction. He would interpret "high satisfaction" as different in kind from "low satisfaction," whereas the cyclical theorist would consider them as different only in degree.

Obivously Fisher supports the position of cyclical theorists, who deal in types of behavior. From this perspective there is no such thing as unique behavior, because any given single behavior one can think of is assumed to be a sub-typical manifestation of a type or category of behavior. Since cyclical theorists tend to categorize all behaviors into from 3 (Schutz) to 6 (Bradford) types of behavior, the presence of recurring phenomena is virtually assured.

Concepts Related to Cyclic Theory

For the purpose of initiating this study the writer classified a model as cyclical if its developmental process featured recurring elements, and especially if the model was described by its author as cyclical. These two criteria now seem inadequate. If the term "cyclical model" is to serve as a useful descriptor in a classification scheme, it must be assigned a more precise meaning.

First three major meanings of the word cycle are explored, since all cycles do not exhibit the same kind of cyclical action. In order to be able to refer later to distinctive types of cycles they will be described here as typel, type 2, and type 3 cycles.

Type 1 Cycle: a period of time during which something becomes established, reaches a peak of growth, declines, and dies. Sometimes called a "life cycle" this kind of cycle features one passage through a sequence of progressive changes or life stages from birth to death. A life cycle does not necessarily feature recurring phenomena. This fact is illustrated by the life-stage model of group development posited recently by Tuckman (23:42-6), which is wholly linear.

Type 2 Cycle: a period of time beginning and ending with the occurrence of the same phenomenon -- illustrated in nature by the time between two appearances of the same

comet. In the realm of group development this kind of cycle is illustrated by the period of time between two occurrences of the same type of event. An event is described as recurring without any reference to contiguous events, i.e., the recurring event is not a component in a regular sequence of multiple events. For example, the recurring group problems in the models of both Gibb and Bradford are somewhat analogous. Each one recurs, but not regularly in relation to some other event.

Type 3 Cycle: a period of time marked by one sequence of a regularly recurring succession of two or more events in which the last event of one sequence always precedes the first event of the next sequence. Here we have a cycle that requires two or more events that recur in an ordered sequence. In the context of this definition the mere recurrence of the same type of events does not document the existence of a cycle or of cyclical dynamics. In general terms, I suggest that to be considered cyclical, a model should feature a "type 3" recurring cycle of events and that the events should be related substantively to the interpersonal activities which produce qualitative changes in the structural properties of the group as it develops.

Since Life Cycle (Type 1) models do not necessarily feature recurring phenomena, and exist in the linear theory tradition as well as in the cyclical tradition, it is

inappropriate to classify such models as "cyclical" unless, of course, they feature a type 3 cycle.

It seems to me that the two factors (a) type of cyclical dynamics and (b) continuity of developmental flow could be considered the major factors in classifying models as either cyclical or linear types. Thus models that feature type 2 recurring phenomena could be classified as "quasi-cyclical" models if the developmental flow is continuous. If the developmental flow is discontinuous, then the model could be classified as "linear, with quasi-cyclical elements."

Below is an attempt to classify the four models in this study in terms of their types of cyclical dynamics and continuity of developmental flow.

Gibb's Model

(1) Recurring elements: four primary "model concerns" (group problem areas) that recur in random order throughout the process (type 2 cycles)

(2) Continuity of developmental flow: continuous

(3) Model classification: quasi-cyclical model

Mills' Model

(1) Recurring elements:

(a) a 3-step cycle of activities by which group problems are generated and resolved in certain phases (type 3 cycle)

(b) four group issues (problems) that appear to recur in a fixed order in certain phases (type 3 cycle)

(2) Continuity of developmental flow: discontinuous

(3) Model classification: linear model, with cyclical elements

Schutz's Model

(1) Recurring elements: three group problems (problem areas) that are manifestations of individual personality needs and recur in the same order in all phases except the termination sequence (type 3 cycle).

(2) Continuity of developmental flow: continuous

(3) Model classification: cyclical model

Bradford's Model

(1) Recurring elements:

(a) a cycle of affective states of member satisfaction/dissatisfaction that recur in a fixed order in groups that develop successfully (type 3 cycles)

(b) six group problems that recur in random order throughout the life of the group (type 2 cycle)

(c) a 4-phase cycle of activities by which successful groups resolve the group problems (type 3 cycle)

(2) Continuity of developmental flow: continuous

(3) Model classification: cyclical model, with quasi-cyclical elements.

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